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Abstract
In this paper we formally prove the correctness of two theorems about cryptographic
protocol analysis by using the Coq proof assistant. The theorems are known as the
Authentication Tests in the strand space formalism. With such tests, we can deter-
mine whether certain values remain secret so we can check whether certain security
properties are achieved by a protocol. Coq is a formal proof management system. It
provides a formal language to express mathematical assertions, mechanically checks
proofs of these assertions. Coq works within the theory of the calculus of inductive
constructions, which is a variation on the calculus of constructions. We first formal-
ize strand spaces by giving definitions in Coq of the basic notions. Then we express
the two authentication tests and give constructive proofs for them.
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This chapter gives a short introduction about project motivations, cryptographic
protocols, and proof assistant.
1.1 Objectives and Project Motivations
Cryptographic protocols are intended to let principals communicate securely over
a communication protocol which are designed to provide various kinds of security
assurances. An important security goal of cryptographic protocol is authentication,
the act of confirming the truth of an attribute of a datum or entity like verifying
freshness of a nonce. Many research papers about authentication have been pub-
lished. One of them is Authentication Tests and the Structure of Bundles by Joshua
Guttman and Javier Thayer [6]. The main idea of authentication tests is that if a
principal in a cryptographic protocol creates and transmits a message containing a
new value v, and later receives v back in a different cryptographic context then it
can be concluded that some principal processing the relevant key has received and
transformed the message in which was emitted. The authentication tests themselves
are easy to apply but the proof justifying them are more complicated [6]. Though
authentication tests are proved in the paper, they have not been formally verified.
As we know that once lemma or a theorem has been proved in some proof assis-
tant language like Coq, we will have a very strong assurance that it is true - much
more than what we usually have when doing a pen-and-paper proof. In addition,
we found that there are few papers and projects using Coq to verify security goal
of cryptographic protocols and to particularly formalize strand spaces, which is a
well-known approach to cryptographic protocols.
In this project we prove authentication tests under strand space formalism ap-
proach using the Coq proof assistant. First, we formalize strand spaces and all basic
concepts needed for proving authentications tests like components,transformation
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paths, penetrable keys. Then we provide detailed formal proofs of all relevant lem-
mas, theorems, and finally authentication tests.
The purpose of the project is to help researchers in security area have more confi-
dence in using the result of authentication tests since they are formally verified. Our
implementation is modular so that researchers can easily extract certain modules
for their purpose. For example, the formalization can be used as a frame work for
later research using strand space approach.
1.2 Reasoning about Cryptographic Protocols
Cryptographic protocols are programs that aim at securing communications on in-
secure networks, such as Internet, by relying on cryptographic primitives. Even
when cryptographic protocols have developed carefully by experts and also reviewed
thoughtfully by other experts, the design of cryptographic protocols may contain
some bugs possibly causing them unusable [9]. For instance, in the Needham-
Schroeder public-key protocol, a flaw (using man in the middle attack method)
was found by Lowe 17 years after its publication. Although much progress has been
made, current cryptographic protocols may still have some flaws. Moreover, security
errors cannot be detected by functional software testing because they appear only
in the presence of a malicious adversary. Automatic tools can therefore be very
helpful in detecting and also verifying the correctness of security protocols. A lot of
tools for verifying and analyzing cryptographic protocols have been developed like
ProVerfi, SATMC, PVS, and CPSA. Hence, security protocol verification has been
a very active research area since 1990s.
There are several techniques for proving protocol correctness. Two common
approaches in this area are symbolic and computational models. Symbolic model
approach relies on specifications while computational model approach relies on im-
plementations. A well-known approach of the former one is strand space model,
developed by Joshua D. Guttman, Javier Thayer Fabrega, and Jonathan C. Herzog
[5]. This approach has several advantages as following.
• It gives a clear semantics to the assumption that certain data items, such as
nonces and session keys, are fresh, and never arise in more than one protocol
run [5].
• It provides an explicit model of the possible behaviors of a system penetra-
tor; this allows to develop general theorems that bound the abilities of the
penetrator, independent of the protocol under study [5].
• It allows various notions of correctness, involving both secrecy and authenti-
cation, to be stated and proved [5].
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• The approach leads to detailed insight into the reasons why the protocol is
correct, and the assumptions required. Proofs are simple and informative: they
are easily developed by hand, and they help to identify more exact conditions
under which we can rely on the protocol [5].
We will describe in details strand spaces in the next chapter.
1.3 Proof Assistants
Proof assistants (interactive theorem provers) are computer systems that allow a user
to do mathematics on a computer, focusing on the aspects of proving and defining
but not so much the computing. So a user can set up a mathematical theory, define
properties and do logical reasoning with them. In many proof assistants one can also
define functions and compute with them, but their main focus is on doing proofs. As
opposed to proof assistants, there are also automated theorem provers. These are
systems consisting of a set of well chosen decision procedures that allow formulas of
a specific restricted format to be proved automatically. Automated theorem provers
are powerful, but have limited expressivity, so there is no way to set-up a generic
mathematical theory in such a system.
There are a lot of proof assistant systems like Isabelle, Coq, PVS, NuPRL. Out
of them, Coq seems to be the most powerful system that supports a lot of features
such as higher-order logic, dependent types, proof automation, proof by reflection,
code generation. The Coq proof assistant is distinguished from the other. That is
the main reason that we chose to use Coq instead of another proof assistant.
In addition, proving using Coq provides numerous advantages over paper-and-
pencil proofs. First, Coq can mechanically check our proofs, hence it provides much
greater confidence on our formalization and on the correctness of our theorems.
Second, because all proofs in Coq are constructive, we can automatically extract
certified implementations of all our theories. This provides runnable tools (for free!)
and give us confidence in the tools as well. Finally, a mechanized representation
is more valuable to others who can easily adapt our work to related projects and
obtain high assurance in the results.
1.4 Related Work
This section shall describe some work that is related to my project.
1. The first one is “A formalization of the spi calculus in Coq” [4]. Spi calculus is
an extension of Pi calculus. It is used to model and study cryptographic pro-
tocols. That project is similar to my project because it is also a formalization
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of some mathematical structure in Coq. However, formalizing spi calculus
and formalizing strand spaces have different styles. While spi calculus is a
functional programming with concurrent processes [4], strand space model is
about logic.
2. The second related work is Proving ”Proving Security Protocols Correct” Cor-
rect: Formal Verification of Strand Spaces by Andrew Kent and J McCarthy.
This work is very similar to my project since it is also to formalize strand
spaces. In this work, they followed an other paper of Joshua Gutmman and
Thayer Javier, which is just about strand spaces. So their goals are to for-
malize strand spaces, and to prove some properties of strand spaces; they did
preliminary work but it remains unpublished. In my project, I have a differ-
ent formalization of strand spaces in Coq and I did prove a lot of lemmas and
theorems about strand spaces, and authentication tests.
3. CertiCrypt is a fully machine-checked framework built on top of the Coq proof
assistant [7]. It is a tool that assists the construction and verification of cryp-
tographic protocols. It supports common patterns for reasoning about cryp-
tography, and has been used successfully to prove many security goals, for
example, encryption, digital signature schemes, and zero-knowledge protocols
[2]. CertiCrypt provides a rich set of verification techniques for probabilistic
programs, including equational theories of observational equivalence, a prob-
abilistic relational Hoare logic, certified program transformations, and tech-
niques widely used in cryptographic proofs such as eager/lazy sampling and
failure events [7]. CertiCrypt works in the “computational model” for protocol




2.1 Strand Space Overview
In this section, we briefly summarize the ideas behind the strand space model. The
Coq development in the next chapter will provide precise definitions.
A strand spaces is a set of strands; one may think of a strand space as containing
all legitimate executions together with all the actions that a penetrator may apply
to the messages contained in these executions.
A strand is a sequence of events that a single principal, either a legitimate
principal or a penetrator, may engage in. The height of a strand is the number
of nodes on that strand. Each strand is a sequence of message transmissions and
receptions with specific values such as nonces and keys. Transmission of a term t
is represented as +t and reception of a term t is represented as −t. Each element
of a strand is called a node. Given a strand s, (s, i) is the ith node on s. We say
that n ⇒ n′ if n = (s, i) and n′ = (s, i + 1). Thus, the relation ⇒+ between two
nodes is the transitive closure of the relation⇒. The relation n→ n′ represents the
inter-strand communication; it means that term(n) = +t and term(n′) = −t; here
term(n) denotes the signed (unsigned) message at the node n.
LetA be the set of all possible messages that can be exchanged between principals
in a protocol. We call elements of A terms. A is freely generated from two disjoint
sets, set of texts T and set of cryptographic keys K, by concatenations encr : K ×
A→ A and encryptions join : A×A→ A. Hence, A is closed under concatenation
and encryption. The set K is equipped with an injective unary operator inv :
K → K which maps each member of asymmetric key pair to the other and maps a
symmetric key to itself.
A signed term is a pair of a sign σ ∈ +,− and a term t, written either < σ, t >
or +t or −t.
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A term t1 is a subterm of another term t2, denoted as t1 @ t2, if we can get
t2 from t1 by repeatedly concatenating with arbitrary terms and encrypting with
arbitrary keys. For example, A,Na are subterms of |NaA|K but K is not.
Another important concept under strand space is origination. We say that a
term t originates at a node n if n is a transmission node, t @ term(n), and t is not
a sub-term of any earlier node of n; hence, n is the first node in its strand includes
t. A node is called uniquely originating if it is originated on only one node over all
strands.
A bundle is a casually well-founded collection of nodes and two relations ⇒
and→. It represents the actual protocol interactions. In a bundle, when a a strand
receives a message m, there is a unique node transmitting m from which the message
was immediately received. In contrast, when a strand transmits a message m, many
strands or none may immediately receive m. The height of a strand in a bundle is
the number of nodes on the strand that are in the bundle.
The penetrator’s powers are characterized by the set of compromised keys which
are initially known to penetrator, and a set of penetrator strands that allow the pen-
etrator to generate new messages. The set of compromised keys typically would con-
tain all public keys, all private keys of penetrators, and all symmetric keys initially
shared between the penetrator and principals playing by the protocol rules. The
atomic actions available to penetrator are encoded in a set of penetrator strands. We
partition penetrator strands according to the operations they exemplify. E-strands
encrypt when given a key and a plain-text; D-strands decrypt when given a decryp-
tion key and matching cipher-text; C-strands concatenate terms; S-strands separate
terms; M-strands emit known atomic text or guess; and K-strands emit keys from
a set of known keys.
Important units for protocol correctness are components. A term t is a compo-
nent of another term t′ if t @ t′, t is nt a concatenated term, and for every s 6= t
such that t @ s @ t′, s is a concatenated term. Thus, a component is either atomic
value or an encryption. A term t is new at a node n =< s, i > if t is a component
of term(n) but t is not a component of node < s, j > for every j < i. A component
is new even if it has occurred earlier as a nested subterm of some larger component.
When a component occurs new in a regular node but was a subterm of some pre-
vious node, then the principal executing that strand has done some cryptographic
work to extract it as a new component[6].
2.2 The Coq Proof Assistant Overview
2.2.1 What is Coq?
We briefly describe what the Coq proof assistant is in this section.
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The Coq system is a computer tool for mechanically verifying theorem proofs,
and at the same time a functional programming language with a powerful type
system.
Once you have proved something in Coq, you have strong assurance that it is
true - more than what you usually have when doing a pen-and-paper proof. These
theorems may concern usual mathematics, proof theory, or program verification.
The Coq proof assistant is very powerful and expressive both for reasoning and pro-
gramming. We can construct from simple terms and write simple proofs to building
whole theories and complex algorithms. It provides an environment for defining
objects (integers, sets, trees, functions...), making statements using logical connec-
tives and basic predicates, and writing proofs. It also provides program extraction
towards Haskell and Ocaml for efficient execution of algorithms and linking with
other libraries.
The Coq compiler automatically checks the correctness of definitions (well-formed
sets, terminating functions...) and of proofs [8].
As a proof assistant, Coq is similar to higher order logic (HOL) systems, a family
of interactive theorem prover based on Church’s HOL including Isabelle, PVS...
Unlike these systems, Coq is based on intuitionistic type theory. Consequently, it
is closer to Epigram, and NuPrl... The common properties of these system are that
functions are programs that can be computed and not just binary relation. Coq
can be used from standard teletype-like shell window but preferably through the
graphical user interface called CoqIde. Coq is not an automated theorem prover
which means that it does not automatically prove theorems. However, it can be
considered as a semi-automated theorem prover since it includes many automatic
theorem proving tatics and various decision procedures. It greatly simplifies the
development of formal proofs by automating some aspects of it.
Under programming language point of view, Coq implements dependently typed
functional programming language, while under logical system, it implements a higher-
order type theory [3]. Coq exploits the notion of Curry-Howard isomorphism - the
correspondence between proofs and programs. The relation between a proof and the
statement it proves is the same as the relation between a program and its type. At
the level of proofs and programs, we have the following correspondence summarized
in Table 1.1.




Table 2.1: At the Level of Proofs and Programs
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And Table 1.2 summaries the correspondence at the level of terms and types. The
Logic side Programming side
universal quantification generalised function space




true formula unit type
false formula bottom (empty) type
Table 2.2: At the Level of Terms and Types
correspondence says that, for example, implication behaves the same as a function
type, conjunction as product type, and disjunction as sum type. The assertion T : τ
means that the term T is of type τ or equivalently that T is a proof of the proposition
τ . A type A→ B is the type of a function that associates a term of type B to any
term of type A, while a proof of A→ B is a term of that type or a term of the form
λx.t where x is a proof of A and t is a proof of B.
There is usually a syntactic distinction between types and terms in most type
theories. However, types and terms are defined as the same syntatic structure so
everything even type is a term in Coq. Consequently, all objects have a type: atomic
types, types for functions, types for proofs, types for types. When manipulated as
terms, types are themselves a type which is a constant of the language called a sort.
Prop and Set are the two base sorts. The sort Prop is the universe of propositions.
The sort Set intends to be the type of small sets and includes data types such as
booleans, natural numbers, and but also includes products, subsets, function type
over these data types [1].
The original Coq system was based on the Calculus of Constructions (CoC). Ver-
sion 7 was based on a generalization of CoC, the Calculus of Inductive Constructions
(CIC). Since version V8 it is based on a weaker calculus, namely Predicate Calcu-
lus of Inductive Constructions (pCIC). The language of CIC also has typed terms,
conversion rules, derived rules, and (co)inductive definitions [1].
2.2.2 Coq Architecture
Coq have two levels architecture - kernel and environment. A relatively small kernel
based on a language with few primitive constructions (sorts, functions, inductive
definitions, product types...) and a limited number of rules for type checking and
computation. On top of the kernel, there is a rich environment to help designing
theories and proofs. This environment offers mechanism like user extensible nota-
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tions, tatics for proof automation, libraries... Any definition or proof defined in the
environment is ultimately checked by the kernel so the environment can be used and
extended safely [8].
As a Coq user, using high level constructions will help to solve a problem quickly.
However, it might also important to understand the underlying low level language in





This chapter contains the formalization of the message algebra. We define the set
of possible messages that can be exchanged between principals in a protocols and
the relations on messages.
Require Import Relation Definitions Relation Operators
Omega Arith ListSet FSetInterface.
3.1 Texts
3.1.1 Definition
Variable Text : Set.
3.1.2 Decidable equality for texts
Variable eq text dec : ∀ (x y :Text), {x = y} + {x 6= y}.
Hint Resolve eq text dec .
3.2 Keys
Interesting design choices about keys. Here we do not model symmetric and asym-
metric keys as separate types; the distinction is just different constructor/injections
into the key type. Sometimes simpler. Possible issue is with key inverses...?
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3.2.1 Definition
Variable Key : Set.
Parameter K p : set Key .
3.2.2 Inverse relation for keys
Variable inv : relation Key .
3.2.3 Inv is commutative
Axiom inv comm : ∀ k k’, inv k k’ → inv k’ k.
3.2.4 Decidable equality for keys
Variable eq key dec : ∀ (x y :Key), {x=y} + {x 6=y}.
Hint Resolve eq key dec .
3.3 Messages
In my formalization, messages are terms (as in the paper). We now define the set
of messages.
3.3.1 Inductive definition for messages
Inductive msg : Set :=
| T : Text → msg
| K : Key → msg
| P : msg → msg → msg
| E : msg → Key → msg.
Hint Constructors msg.
3.3.2 Decidable equality for messages
Definition eq msg dec : ∀ x y : msg,






Hint Resolve eq msg dec.
3.3.3 Signed messages
In a protocol, principals can either send or receive messages.We repesent transmis-
sion of a message as the occurrence of that message with positive sign, and reception
of a message as its occurrence with negative sign [6]. So in Coq, signed messages are
defined as an inductive set with two constructors, one for possitive signed messages
and the other for negative signed messages.
Definition
Inductive smsg :=
| xmit msg : msg → smsg
| recv msg : msg → smsg.
Notation ”+ m” := (xmit msg m) (at level 30) : ma scope.
Notation ”- m” := (recv msg m) : ma scope.
Signed messages to messages
A function to convert signed messages to messages.
Definition smsg 2 msg (m : smsg) : msg :=
match m with
| (xmit msg x ) ⇒ x
| (recv msg x ) ⇒ x
end.
Hint Resolve smsg 2 msg.
Decidable equality for signed messages





Hint Resolve eq smsg dec.
12
3.3.4 Atomic messages
A message is atomic if it is either a text message or a key message.
Inductive atomic : msg → Prop :=
|atomic text : ∀ t, atomic (T t)
|atomic key : ∀ k, atomic (K k).
Hint Constructors atomic.
3.3.5 Concatenated messages
Inductive pair : (msg → Prop) :=
| pair step : ∀ m1 m2, pair (P m1 m2 ).
Hint Constructors pair.
3.3.6 Encrypted messages
Inductive enc : msg → Prop :=
| enc step : ∀ m k, enc (E m k).
Hint Constructors enc.
3.3.7 Simple message
A message is simple if it is not a concatenated (paired) message.
Inductive simple : msg → Prop :=
| simple step : ∀ m, ¬ pair m → simple m.




unfold not. intro Hpair.
inversion Hpair.
Qed.
3.3.8 Some basic results about atomic, paired, and simple
Lemma pair not atomic :




intros m HConc HAtom.
inversion HConc; inversion HAtom; subst; discriminate.
Qed.
Lemma atom not pair:
∀ m, atomic m → ¬ pair m.
Proof.
unfold not.
intros m HAtom Hpair.
inversion Hpair ; inversion HAtom; subst; discriminate.
Qed.
Lemma enc not atomic : ∀ m1 m2, ¬ atomic (P m1 m2 ).
Proof.
unfold not.
intros m1 m2 Hatom.
inversion Hatom.
Qed.




apply atom not pair; assumption.
Qed.
3.4 Freeness assumptions
Pair and enryption freess assumptions are provable in this context. If two concate-
nated (or encrypted) messages are equal then each component of the first is equal
the corresponding componet of the second.
3.4.1 Pair freeness
Lemma pair free : ∀ m1 m2 m1’ m2’,
P m1 m2 = P m1’ m2’ → m1 = m1’ ∧ m2 = m2’.
Proof.





Lemma enc free : ∀ m k m’ k’,
E m k = E m’ k’ → m = m’ ∧ k = k’.
Proof.





Called “carried by” in some CPSA publications, and “subterm” in the “Authenti-
cation Tests and the structures of bundles”.
3.5.1 Definition
The ingred relation is defined inductively as following.
Inductive ingred : msg → msg → Prop :=
| ingred refl : ∀ m, ingred m m
| ingred pair l : ∀ m l r,
ingred m l → ingred m (P l r)
| ingred pair r : ∀ m l r,
ingred m r → ingred m (P l r)
| ingred encr : ∀ m x k,
ingred m x → ingred m (E x k).
Notation ”a ¡st b” := (ingred a b) (at level 30) : ss scope.
Open Scope ss scope.
3.5.2 Proper ingredient
Definition proper ingred (x y : msg) : Prop :=
ingred x y ∧ x 6= y.
Notation ”a ¡¡st b” := (proper ingred a b) (at level 30) : ss scope.
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3.5.3 Properties of the ingredient relation
Transitive
Lemma ingred trans :
∀ x y z, x <st y → y <st z → x <st z.
Proof.
intros x y z Sxy Syz.
induction Syz.
subst; auto.
subst; apply ingred pair l; apply IHSyz ; assumption.
subst; apply ingred pair r; apply IHSyz ; assumption.
apply ingred encr; apply IHSyz ; assumption.
Qed.
Hint Resolve ingred trans.
Some other basic results about ingredients
Lemma ingred pair : ∀ (x y z :msg), x 6= (P y z) →
x <st (P y z) →
x <st y ∨ x <st z.
Proof.
intros x y z Hneq Hst.
inversion Hst ; subst.




Hint Resolve ingred pair.
Lemma ingred enc : ∀ (x y :msg) (k :Key), x 6= (E y k) →
x <st (E y k) →
x <st y.
Proof.
intros x y k Hneq Hst.
inversion Hst ; subst.
elim Hneq ; trivial.
auto.
Qed.
Hint Resolve ingred enc.
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3.6 Size of messages
3.6.1 Definition
Fixpoint size (m:msg) :=
match m with
| T t ⇒ 1
| K k ⇒ 1
| P m1 m2 ⇒ (size m1) + (size m2)
| E x k ⇒ (size x) + 1
end.
Size of every message is always positive Lemma zero lt size : ∀ x, 0 < size x.
Proof.
intro x.
induction x ; simpl; omega.
Qed.
Hint Resolve zero lt size.
Lemma size lt plus l : ∀ x y, size x < size x + size y.
Proof.
intros x y.
assert (size x + 0 < size x + size y).
apply plus lt compat l. apply zero lt size.
rewrite (plus comm (size x ) 0) in H.
rewrite (plus O n (size x )) in H. auto.
Qed.
3.6.2 Realtionship between ingredient and size
Size of an ingredient x is always less than or equal size of message y if x is an
ingredient of y.
Lemma ingred lt :
∀ x y, x <st y → size(x ) ≤ size(y).
Proof.
intros x y Hst.
induction Hst ; subst; simpl; omega.
Qed.
Lemma ingred ge size eq :
∀ x y, x <st y → size(x ) ≥ size(y) → x=y.
Proof.
intros x y Hst Hsize gt.
17
inversion Hst ; subst.
auto.
assert (Hx lt l : size x ≤ size l). apply ingred lt; auto.
assert (Hl lt Plr : size l < size (P l r)).
simpl. apply size lt plus l.
assert (Hx lt Plr : size x < size (P l r)). omega.
contradict Hsize gt. omega.
assert (Hx lt r : size x ≤ size r). apply ingred lt; auto.
assert (Hl lt Plr : size r < size (P l r)).
simpl. rewrite ← (plus comm). apply size lt plus l.
assert (Hx lt Plr : size x < size (P l r)). omega.
contradict Hsize gt. omega.
assert (Hx lt l : size x ≤ size x0 ). apply ingred lt; auto.
assert (Hx0 lt E : size x0 < size (E x0 k)).
simpl. omega.
assert (Hx lt E : size x < size (E x0 k)). omega.
contradict Hsize gt. omega.
Qed.
Hint Resolve ingred ge size eq.
If each message is an ingredient of each other, then they are equal.
Lemma ingred eq : ∀ (x y :msg), x <st y → y <st x → x = y.
Proof.
intros x y Hxy Hyx.
apply ingred ge size eq.
auto.
apply ingred lt; auto.
Qed.
Hint Resolve ingred eq.
Lemma atomic ingred eq :
∀ x a, atomic a → ingred x a → x=a.
Proof.
intros x a Hat Hin.
inversion Hat ; subst; inversion Hin; auto.
Qed.
Hint Resolve atomic ingred eq.
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3.7 Components
Intuitively, a message x is a component of a message m if we can get x just by
seperation out all the pairs in m, without using decryption.
3.7.1 Component of a message
A message t0 is an e-ingredients of message t if t is in the smallest set containing t0
and closed under concatenation with arbitrary term t1, i.e, if t0 is an atomic value
of t.
Inductive e ingred : relation msg :=
| e ingred refl : ∀ (t0 :msg), e ingred t0 t0
| e ingred pair l : ∀ t0 t1 t2,
e ingred t0 t1 → e ingred t0 (P t1 t2 )
| e ingred pair r : ∀ t0 t1 t2,
e ingred t0 t2 → e ingred t0 (P t1 t2 ).
Hint Constructors e ingred.
Inductive comp : relation msg :=
| comp step : ∀ m1 m2,
simple m1 → e ingred m1 m2 → comp m1 m2.
Notation ”a ¡com b” := (comp a b) (at level 30) : ss scope.
Hint Constructors comp.
3.7.2 Component implies ingredient
Lemma e ingred imp ingred : ∀ m1 m2, e ingred m1 m2 → ingred m1 m2.
Proof.
intros m1 m2 Hein.
induction Hein; subst.
apply ingred refl.
apply ingred pair l; assumption.
apply ingred pair r; assumption.
Qed.
Lemma comp imp ingred : ∀ (m1 m2 :msg), m1 <com m2 → m1 <st m2.
Proof.
intros m1 m2 Hcom.
apply e ingred imp ingred.
inversion Hcom; subst; assumption.
Qed.
19
3.7.3 Concatenation or pairing preserves components
If a message x is a component an other message m1, it also is a component of
every message which is concatenated from m1 and an abitrary message m2 Lemma
preserve comp l : ∀ x m1 m2, comp x m1 → comp x (P m1 m2 ).
Proof.




apply e ingred pair l; assumption.
Qed.
Lemma preserve comp r : ∀ x m1 m2, comp x m2 → comp x (P m1 m2 ).
Proof.




apply e ingred pair r; assumption.
Qed.
3.7.4 An atomic message is a component of itself




apply atomic imp simple; assumption.
apply e ingred refl.
Qed.
3.7.5 A simple message is a component of itself








A message t0 is an k-ingredients of message t if t is in the smallest set containing
t0 and closed under encryption and concatenation with arbitrary term t1, i.e, if t0
is an atomic value of t.
Variable F : Set.
Parameter inj F K : F → Key .
Axiom inj F K inj : ∀ x y : F, inj F K x = inj F K y → x = y.
Coercion inj F K : F ¿-¿ Key.
Inductive k ingred : relation msg :=
| k ingred refl : ∀ (t0 :msg), k ingred t0 t0
| k ingred pair l : ∀ (t0 t1 t2 : msg),
k ingred t0 t1 → k ingred t0 (P t1 t2 )
| k ingred pair r : ∀ (t0 t1 t2 : msg),
k ingred t0 t2 → k ingred t0 (P t1 t2 )
| k ingred enc : ∀ (t0 t1 : msg) (k : F ),
k ingred t0 t1 → k ingred t0 (E t1 k).





This chapter contains the formalization of most of the basic concepts of strand
spaces, including strand, node, penetrator strand, strand edges, new component...
Require Import Classical.
Require Import Message Algebra.
Require Import Lists.ListSet Lists.List.
Require Import Omega ZArith.
Require Import Relation Definitions Relation Operators.
Open Scope list scope.
Import ListNotations.
Open Scope ma scope.
4.1 Strands
4.1.1 Strand Definition
A strand is a sequence of events; it represents either an execution by a legitimate
party in a security protocol or else a sequence of actions by a penetrator [6]. In Coq,
we define a strand as a list of signed messages.
Definition strand : Type := list smsg.
4.1.2 Decidable equality for strands
It is provable in this context.





Hint Resolve eq strand dec.
4.2 Nodes
4.2.1 Definition
A node is a pair of a strand and a natural number, which is less than the length of
the strand. The natural number is called “index” of that node. Note that the list
index in Coq starts from zero.
Definition node : Type := {n:(prod strand nat)| snd n < length (fst n)}.
4.2.2 Strand of a node
Strand of a node function takes a node and returns the strand of that node.
Definition strand of (n:node) : strand := match n with
| exist apair ⇒ fst apair end.
4.2.3 Index of a node
Index of a node function takes a node and returns the index of that node.
Definition index of (n:node) : nat := match n with
| exist apair ⇒ snd apair end.
4.2.4 Decidable equality for nodes
For any two nodes, we can decide whether they are equal or not.
Definition eq node dec : ∀ x y : node,
{x = y} + {x 6= y}.
Proof.
intros [[xs xn] xp] [[ys yn] yp].
destruct (eq strand dec xs ys) as [EQs | NEQs ]; subst.
destruct (eq nat dec xn yn) as [EQn | NEQn]; subst.
left. rewrite (proof irrelevance (lt yn (length ys)) xp yp). reflexivity.
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right. intros C. inversion C. auto.
right. intros C. inversion C. auto.
Qed.
Hint Resolve eq node dec.
4.2.5 Signed message of a node
We want to have a function that takes a node and returns the signed message of that
node. However, it is a little bit hard to write it in Coq since node is a dependent
type. Specificly, a node just contains its strand and its index, so we need to extract
the signed message at the “index-th” position on the strand. Below are some helper
functions for defining such the function.
Definition option smsg of (n:node) : (option smsg) :=
match n with
| exist (s,i) ⇒ nth error s i end.
Lemma nth error len :
∀ (A:Type) (l :list A) (n:nat),
nth error l n = None → (length l) ≤ n.
Proof.
intros A l n. generalize dependent l.
induction n.
intros l H.
unfold nth error in H.
unfold error in H. destruct l. auto. inversion H.
intros l1 H. destruct l1. simpl; omega.
inversion H. apply IHn in H. simpl. omega.
Qed.
Lemma valid smsg : ∀ (n:node), {m:smsg | option smsg of n = Some m}.
Proof.
intros n.
remember (option smsg of n) as opn.
destruct n. destruct opn.
∃ s. auto.
unfold option smsg of in Heqopn.
destruct x. simpl in l.
symmetry in Heqopn.
apply nth error len in Heqopn.
omega.
Qed.
Here is the actual signed message of a node function.
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Definition smsg of (n:node) : smsg := match (valid smsg n) with
| exist m ⇒ m end.
4.2.6 Unsigned message of a node
To get the unsigned message of a node, just convert its singed message to the
unsigned one.
Definition msg of (n:node) : msg := smsg 2 msg (smsg of n).
4.2.7 Predicate for positive and negative nodes
A node is a positive (transmission) node if the signed message of that node is positive
Definition xmit (n:node) : Prop := ∃ (m:msg), smsg of n = + m.
A node is a negative (reception) node if the signed message of that node is
negative
Definition recv (n:node) : Prop := ∃ (m:msg), smsg of n = - m.
4.3 Penetrator Strands
Section PenetratorStrand.
The penetrator’s powers are characterized by the set of compromised keys which
are initially known to penetrator, and a set of penetrator strands that allow the
penetrator to generate new messages. The set of compromised keys typically would
contain all public keys, all private keys of penetrators, and all symmetric keys ini-
tially shared between the penetrator and principals playing by the protocol rules
[9].
Parameter K p : set Key .
The atomic actions available to penetrator are encoded in a set of penetrator
strands. We partition penetrator strands according to the operations they exemplify.
4.3.1 Text Message Strand
M-strands emit known atomic text or guess.
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Inductive MStrand (s : strand) : Prop :=
| P M : ∀ t : Text, s = [+ (T t)] → MStrand s.
Hint Constructors MStrand.
4.3.2 Key Strand
K-strands emit keys from a set of known keys.
Inductive KStrand (s : strand) : Prop :=




Inductive CStrand (s : strand) : Prop :=




Inductive SStrand (s : strand) : Prop :=
| P S : ∀ (g h : msg), s = [- (P g h); + g ; + h] → SStrand s.
Hint Constructors SStrand.
4.3.5 Encryption Strand
E-strands encrypt when given a key and a plain-text.
Inductive EStrand (s : strand) : Prop :=
| P E : ∀ (k : Key) (h :msg), s = [- (K k); - h; + (E h k)] → EStrand s.
Hint Constructors EStrand.
4.3.6 Decryption Strand
D-strands decrypt when given a decryption key and matching cipher-text.
Inductive DStrand (s : strand) : Prop :=
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| P D : ∀ (k k’ : Key) (h :msg),
inv k k’ → s = [- ( K k’); - (E h k); + h] → DStrand s.
Hint Constructors DStrand.
4.3.7 Definition for PenetratorStrand
Hence, a strand is called a penetrator strand if it is one of the above strands.
Inductive PenetratorStrand (s :strand) :Prop :=
| PM : MStrand s → PenetratorStrand s
| PK : KStrand s → PenetratorStrand s
| PC : CStrand s → PenetratorStrand s
| PS : SStrand s → PenetratorStrand s
| PE : EStrand s → PenetratorStrand s
| PD : DStrand s → PenetratorStrand s.
Hint Constructors PenetratorStrand.
4.3.8 Predicates for penetrable nodes and regular nodes
A node is a penetrator node if the strand it lies on is a penetrator strand.
Definition p node (n:node) : Prop := PenetratorStrand (strand of(n)).
A non-penetrator node is called a regular node.
Definition r node (n:node) : Prop := ¬ p node n.
4.3.9 Axiom for penetrator node and regular node
Every node is either a penatrator node or regular node.




The inter-strand communication is represented as a relation on nodes. x –¿ y means
that a transmission node x sends message to a reception node y.
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Inductive msg deliver : relation node :=
| msg deliver step : ∀ (x y : node) (m:msg),
smsg of x = +m ∧ smsg of y = -m ∧ strand of(x ) 6= strand of(y)
→ msg deliver x y.
Hint Constructors msg deliver.
Notation ”x –¿ y” := (msg deliver x y) (at level 0, right associativity) :
ss scope.
4.4.2 Iner-strand Edges - Strand ssuccessor
A node y is the successor of a node x, denoted as x ==¿ y, if they are on the same
strand and y is immediately after x on the list of nodes of the strand.
Inductive ssucc : relation node :=
| ssucc step : ∀ (x y : node), strand of(x ) = strand of(y) ∧
index of(x ) + 1 = index of(y) → ssucc x y.
Hint Constructors ssucc.
Notation ”x ==¿ y” := (ssucc x y) (at level 0, right associativity) : ss scope.
Transitive closure of strand ssuccessor Definition ssuccs : relation node :=
clos trans node ssucc.
Notation ”x ==¿+ y” := (ssuccs x y) (at level 0, right associativity) :
ss scope.
Reflexive Transitive Closure of strand successor Definition ssuccseq : relation
node := clos refl trans node ssucc.
4.4.3 Edges on Strand
An edge is a realtion on nodes and it is either a inter-strand or inner-strand relation.
Inductive strand edge : relation node :=
| strand edge single : ∀ x y, msg deliver x y → strand edge x y
| strand edge double : ∀ x y, ssucc x y → strand edge x y.
Hint Constructors strand edge.
Transitive closure of edge Definition prec := clos trans node strand edge.
Notation ”x ==¿* y” := (ssuccseq x y) (at level 0, right associativity) :
ss scope.
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4.4.4 Constructive and Destructive Edges
An edge is constructive if both nodes lie on a encryption or concatenation strand.
Inductive cons edge : relation node :=
| cons e : ∀ x y, ssuccs x y → EStrand (strand of x ) → cons edge x y
| cons c : ∀ x y, ssuccs x y → CStrand (strand of x ) → cons edge x y.
Hint Constructors cons edge.
An edge is destructive if both nodes lie on a decryption or separation strand.
Inductive des edge : relation node :=
| des d : ∀ x y, ssuccs x y → DStrand (strand of x ) → des edge x y
| des s : ∀ x y, ssuccs x y → SStrand (strand of x ) → des edge x y.
Hint Constructors des edge.
4.5 Origination
We say that a message m is originate at a node n if n is a trasmission node, m is an
ingredient of the message of n, and m is not an ingredient of any earlier node of n.
Definition orig at (n:node) (m:msg) : Prop :=
xmit(n) ∧ (ingred m (msg of n)) ∧
(∀ (n’ :node), ((ssuccs n’ n) →
(ingred m (msg of n’ )) → False)).
Definition non orig (m:msg) : Prop := ∀ (n:node), ¬orig at n m.
If a value originates on only one node in the strand space, we call it uniquely
originating.
Definition unique (m:msg) : Prop :=
(∃ (n:node), orig at n m) ∧
(∀ (n n’ :node),(orig at n m) ∧ (orig at n’ m) → n=n’).
4.6 Axioms
4.6.1 The bundle axiom: every received message was sent
Axiom was sent : ∀ x : node, (recv x ) →
(∃ y : node, msg deliver y x ).
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4.6.2 Normal bundle axiom
Axiom not k k : ∀ k k’, inv k k’ → DStrand [-(K k); -(E (K k) k’); + (K k)].
4.6.3 Well-foundedness
Axiom wf prec : well founded prec.
4.7 Minimal nodes
Definition is minimal: (node → Prop) → node → Prop :=
fun P x ⇒ (P x) ∧ ∀ y, (prec y x ) → ~( P y).
Definition has min elt: (node → Prop) → Prop :=
fun P ⇒ ∃ x :node, is minimal P x.
4.8 New Component
4.8.1 Component of a node
A message is a component of a node if it is a component of the message at that
node.
Definition comp of node (m:msg) (n:node) : Prop := comp m (msg of n).
Notation ”x ¡[node] y” := (comp of node x y) (at level 50) : ss scope.
4.8.2 New at
A message is new at a node if it is a component of that node and the message is not
a component of any ealier node in the same strand with the node.
Definition new at (m:msg) (n:node) : Prop :=
m <[node] n ∧ ∀ (n’ : node) , ssuccs n’ n → m <[node] n’→ False.
4.9 Paths
Section Path.
Parameter default node : node.
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4.9.1 Path condition
A path edge is either a message deliver or a ssuccs where the first node is positive
and the second node is negative.
Inductive path edge (m n : node) : Prop :=
| path edge single : msg deliver m n → path edge m n
| path edge double : ssuccs m n ∧ recv(m) ∧ xmit(n) → path edge m n.
Hint Constructors path edge.
Notation ”m —–¿ n” := (path edge m n) (at level 30) : ss scope.
4.9.2 The n-th node of a path
It takes a natural number and a list of nodes and returns the node at the n-th
postition on the list.
Definition nth node (i :nat) (p:list node) : node :=
nth default default node p i.
Hint Resolve nth node.
4.9.3 Definitions for paths
A path is any finite sequence of nodes where for all two consecutive nodes they form
a path edge.
Definition is path (p:list node) : Prop :=
∀ i, i < length(p) - 1 → path edge (nth node i p) (nth node (i+1) p).
4.9.4 Axiom for paths
All paths begin on a positive node and end on a negative node.
Axiom path begin pos end neg : ∀ (p:list node),
xmit(nth node 0 p) ∧ recv(nth node (length(p)-1) p).
4.9.5 Penetrator Paths
A penetrator path is one in which all nodes other than possibily the first or the last
are pentrator nodes.
Definition p path (p:list node): Prop := is path p ∧ ∀ i,
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(i > 0 ∧ i < length p - 1) → p node (nth node i p).
Any penetrator path that begins at a regular node contains only constructive
and destructive edges.
Lemma p path cons or des :
∀ p, p path p → r node (nth node 0 p) →
(∀ i, i < length p - 1 →
cons edge (nth node i p) (nth node (i+1) p) ∨
des edge (nth node i p) (nth node (i+1) p)).
Admitted.
4.9.6 Falling and rising paths
A pentrator path is falling if for all adjacent nodes n, n′ on the path the message of
n′ is an ingredient of n′s.
Definition falling path ( p : list node) : Prop :=
p path p ∧ ∀ i, i < length(p)-1 →
ingred (msg of (nth node (i+1) p)) (msg of (nth node i p)).
A pentrator path is rising if for all adjacent nodes n, n′ on the path the message
of n is an ingredient of the message of n′.
Definition rising path (p : list node) : Prop :=
p path p ∧ ∀ i, i < length(p)-1 →
ingred (msg of (nth node i p)) (msg of (nth node (i+1) p)).
4.9.7 Destructive and Constructive Paths
A penetrator path is constructive if it contains only constructive edges.
Definition cons path (p :list node) : Prop :=
p path p ∧ (∀ i, i < length p - 1 →
ssuccs (nth node i p) (nth node (i+1) p) →
cons edge (nth node i p) (nth node (i+1) p)).
Definition cons path not key (p : list node) : Prop :=
cons path p ∧ (∀ i, i < length p - 1 →
des edge (nth node i p) (nth node (i+1) p) →
EStrand (strand of (nth node i p)) →
∃ k , msg of (nth node i p) = K k → False).
A penetrator path is destructive if it contains only destructive edges.
32
Definition des path (p :list node) : Prop :=
p path p ∧ (∀ i, i < length p - 1 →
ssuccs (nth node i p) (nth node (i+1) p) →
des edge (nth node i p) (nth node (i+1) p)).
Definition des path not key (p : list node) : Prop :=
des path p ∧ (∀ i, i < length p - 1 →
des edge (nth node i p) (nth node (i+1) p) →
DStrand (strand of (nth node i p)) →
∃ k, msg of (nth node i p) = K k → False).
End Path.
4.10 Penetrable Keys and Safe Keys
Penetrable key is already penetrated (K p) or some regular strand puts it in a form
that could allow it to be penetrated, because for each key protecting it, the matching
key decryption key is already pentrable [6].
Section Penetrable Keys.
Parameter Kp : Set.
Parameter Pk : nat → Key → Prop.
Axiom init pkeys : sig (Pk 0) = Kp.
Axiom next pkeys : ∀ (i :nat) (k :Key), (∃ (n:node) (t :msg),
r node n ∧ xmit n ∧ new at t n ∧
k ingred (sig (Pk i)) (K k) t) → Pk (i+1) k.
Inductive PKeys (k :Key) : Prop :=
| pkey step : (∃ (i :nat), Pk i k) → PKeys k.
End Penetrable Keys.
4.11 Transformation paths
Given a test of the form n ⇒+ n′, the strategy for proving the authentication test
results is to consider the paths leading from n to n′. Because there is a value
a originating uniquely at n, and it is received back at n′, there must be a path
leading from n to n′(apart from the trivial path that follows the strand from n to
n′). Moreover, since a is received in a new form at n′, there must be a step along
the path that changes its form; this is a transforming edge. The incoming and
outgoing authentication test results codify conditions under which we can infer that
a transforming edge lies on a regular strand [6].
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The proofs focus on the transformation paths leading from n to n′ that keep
track of a relevant component containing a. The relevant component changes only
when a transforming edge is traversed, and a occurs in a new component of a node
between n and n′. We regard the edge n⇒+ n′ as a transformed edge, because the
same value a occurs in both nodes, but node n contains a in transformed form[1].
Notice that the difinition of transformed and transforming edges are modified a
little bit to make the proof work precisely. The component of n′ containing a is not
necessarily new at n′ but it is new at some node in between n and n′ [6].
Section Trans path.
Definition path : Type := list (prod node msg).
Variable p : path.
Variable a : msg.
Parameter default msg : msg.
Definition ln := fst (split p).
Hint Resolve ln.
Definition lm := snd (split p).
Hint Resolve lm.
A function that takes a natural number and a list of messages and returns the
message at the n-th postion in the list. If the natural number is out of range, then
a default message is returned.
Definition nth msg : nat → list msg → msg :=
fun (n:nat) (p:list msg) ⇒ nth default default msg p n.
Hint Resolve nth msg.
Definition L (n:nat) := nth msg n lm.
Hint Resolve L.
Definition nd (n:nat) := nth node n ln.
Hint Resolve nd.
An abstract predicate for defining transforming edge and transformed edge.
Definition transformed edge (x y : node) (a:msg) : Prop :=
ssuccs x y ∧ atomic a ∧
∃ z Ly, ssuccs x z ∧ ssuccseq z y ∧
new at Ly z ∧ a <st Ly ∧ Ly <[node] y.
A transformed edge emits a atomic message a and later receives in a new form.
Definition transformed edge for (x y : node) (a :msg) : Prop :=
transformed edge x y a ∧ xmit x ∧ recv y.
A transforming edge receive a and later emits it in transformed form.
Definition transforming edge for (x y : node) (a :msg) : Prop :=
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transformed edge x y a ∧ recv x ∧ xmit y.
A transformation path is a path for which each node ni is labelled by a component
Li of ni in such a way that Li = Li+1 unless ni ⇒ ni+1 is a trans edge.
Definition is trans path : Prop :=
(is path ln ∨ (ssuccs (nd 0) (nd 1) ∧ xmit (nd 0) ∧
xmit (nd 1) ∧ is path (tl ln))) ∧
atomic a ∧
∀ (n:nat), (n < length p → a <st (L n) ∧ (L n) <[node] (nd n)) ∧
(n < length p - 1 → (L n = L (n+1) ∨ (L n 6= L (n+1) →
transformed edge (nd n) (nd (n+1)) a))).
A transformation path does not traverse the key edge of a D-strand or E-strand.
Definition not traverse key : Prop :=
∀ i, i < length p - 1 → (DStrand (strand of (nd i)) ∨ EStrand (strand of (nd
i))) →
∃ k, msg of (nd i) = K k → False.
End Trans path.
4.11.1 Axiom about penetrator strands and penetrator nodes
Lemma P node strand :
∀ (n:node), p node n → PenetratorStrand (strand of n).
Proof.





This chapter contains a collection of technical results conveninet for proving larger
results about strand spaces.
Require Import Lists.List Omega Ring ZArith.
Require Import Strand Spaces Message Algebra.
Require Import ProofIrrelevance Classical.
Require Import Relation Definitions Relation Operators.
Require Import List Library.
Import ListNotations.
5.1 Messages
Convert signed messages to (unsigned) messages
Lemma smsg 2 msg xmit : ∀ n m, smsg of n = +m → msg of n = m.
Proof.
intros. unfold msg of. rewrite H. auto.
Qed.
Lemma smsg 2 msg recv : ∀ n m, smsg of n = -m → msg of n = m.
Proof.
intros. unfold msg of. rewrite H. auto.
Qed.
Lemma node smsg msg xmit : ∀ n t,
smsg of(n) = (+ t) →
msg of(n) = t.
Proof.
intros n t H.
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unfold msg of. rewrite H. reflexivity.
Qed.
Hint Resolve node smsg msg xmit.
Lemma node smsg msg recv : ∀ n t,
smsg of(n) = (- t) →
msg of(n) = t.
Proof.
intros n t H.
unfold msg of. rewrite H. reflexivity.
Qed.
Hint Resolve node smsg msg recv.
Lemma nth error some In {X :Type}: ∀ l i (x :X ),
nth error l i = Some x →
List.In x l.
Proof.
intros l. induction l.
intros i x nth. destruct i. simpl in nth; inversion nth.
simpl in nth; inversion nth.
intros i x nth.
destruct i. simpl in nth. inversion nth. left. reflexivity.
simpl in nth. right. eapply IHl. exact nth.
Qed.
Hint Resolve nth error some In.
Lemma nth error node : ∀ n,
nth error (strand of n) (index of n) = Some (smsg of n).
Proof.
intros n.
unfold smsg of. destruct valid smsg.
destruct n. simpl in *.
destruct x0. simpl. auto.
Qed.
Hint Resolve nth error node.
Lemma strand node : ∀ (s : strand) (i : nat),
i < length s →
∃ n, strand of n = s ∧ index of n = i.
Proof.
intros s i len.






Hint Resolve strand node.
Every signed message of a node must be some signed message in the node’s
strand
Lemma smsg in strand : ∀ n s,
(strand of n) = s →
List.In (smsg of n) s.
Proof.
intros.
eapply nth error some In. subst.
apply nth error node.
Qed.
5.2 Xmit and recv
No node is both transmit and receive.
Lemma xmit vs recv: ∀ (n:node), xmit(n) → recv(n) → False.
Proof.
intros n Hx Hr.
inversion Hx. inversion Hr.
rewrite H in H0. discriminate.
Qed.
every node is either transmit or receive
Lemma xmit or recv: ∀ (n: node), xmit n ∨ recv n.
Proof.
intros n. unfold xmit, recv. case (smsg of n).
intros. left. ∃ m. auto.
intros. right. ∃ m. auto.
Qed.
Lemma eq nodes : ∀ (x y : node), strand of(x ) = strand of(y) →
index of(x ) = index of(y) → x = y.
Proof.
intros [[xs xn] xp] [[ys yn] yp] eq index eq strand.
simpl in eq index, eq strand. subst.
rewrite (proof irrelevance (lt yn (length ys)) xp yp). reflexivity.
Qed.
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5.3 Predecessor and message deliver
5.3.1 Baby result about msg deliver
Lemma msg deliver xmit : ∀ x y, msg deliver x y → xmit x.
Proof.
intros x y Md.
destruct Md.
unfold xmit. ∃ m; apply H.
Qed.
Lemma msg deliver recv : ∀ x y, msg deliver x y → recv y.
Proof.
intros x y Md.
destruct Md.
unfold recv. ∃ m; apply H.
Qed.
5.3.2 Baby results about prec
Theorem prec transitive:





∀ x y, (msg deliver x y) → (prec x y).
Proof.
intros. constructor. constructor. auto.
Qed.
5.4 Succsessor
This section contains lemmas about successor, transitive closure, reflexive transitive
closure, and the relations between succsessor and index of nodes. For example, if y
is a successor of x, then the index of y is greater than the index of x.
Lemma ssucc index lt :
∀ x y, ssucc x y → index of x < index of y.
Proof.




Lemma ssuccs index lt :
∀ x y, ssuccs x y → index of x < index of y.
Proof.
intros x y Sxy.
induction Sxy. apply ssucc index lt. auto.
omega.
Qed.
Lemma ssuccseq index lteq :
∀ x y, ssuccseq x y → index of x ≤ index of y.
Proof.
intros x y Sxy.
induction Sxy. assert (index of x < index of y).
apply ssucc index lt. auto. omega. auto. omega.
Qed.
Lemma index lt one ssucc :
∀ x y, strand of x = strand of y → index of x + 1= index of y → ssucc x y.
Proof. auto. Qed.
Lemma index lt ssuccs :
∀ x y, strand of x = strand of y → index of x < index of y → ssuccs x y.
Proof.
intros x y Sxy lt.
Admitted.
Lemma ssuccs imp ssuccseq :
∀ x y, ssuccs x y → ssuccseq x y.
Proof.
intros x y Sxy.
induction Sxy. apply rt step. auto.
apply rt trans with (y :=y); auto.
Qed.
Lemma index lteq ssuccseq :
∀ x y, strand of x = strand of y → index of x ≤ index of y → ssuccseq x y.
Proof.
intros x y Sxy lt.
assert (index of x = index of y ∨ index of x < index of y). omega.
case H. intros. assert (x=y). apply eq nodes; auto.
rewrite H1. apply rt refl.
intros. apply ssuccs imp ssuccseq.




Lemma ssucc acyclic: ∀ (n:node), ssucc n n → False.
Proof.
intros n Hs. inversion Hs. destruct H. omega.
Qed.
Transitive closure of strand successor is also irreflexive.
Lemma ssuccs acyclic : ∀ (n:node), ssuccs n n → False.
Proof.
intros n Snn.





∀ (x y z : node), ssucc x y → ssucc x z → y = z.
Proof.
intros x y z Hxy Hxz.
destruct Hxy, Hxz.
apply eq nodes; destruct H, H0 ; try omega; congruence.
Qed.
Hint Resolve ssucc unique.
Every node and its successor are on the same strand.
Lemma ssucc same strand :
∀ (x y : node), ssucc x y → strand of(x ) = strand of(y).
Proof.
intros x y Sxy. inversion Sxy. destruct H ; auto.
Qed.
Hint Resolve ssucc same strand.
Lemma ssuccs same strand :
∀ (x y : node), ssuccs x y → strand of x = strand of y.
Proof.




Hint Resolve ssuccs same strand.
Lemma ssuccseq same strand :
∀ (x y : node), ssuccseq x y → strand of x = strand of y.
Proof.
intros x y Sxy.
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induction Sxy.





∀ x y, (ssucc x y) → (prec x y).
Proof.




∀ x y, (ssuccs x y) → (prec x y).
Proof.
intros x y Sxy.
induction Sxy.
apply ssucc prec; auto.
apply prec transitive with (y :=y); auto.
Qed.
Ssuccs is transitive
Lemma ssuccs trans :
∀ x y z, ssuccs x y → ssuccs y z → ssuccs x z.
Proof.
intros x y z Sxy Syz.
apply t trans with (y :=y); auto.
Qed.
Lemma path edge prec :
∀ x y, path edge x y → prec x y.
Proof.
intros x y Pxy.
inversion Pxy.
apply deliver prec; auto.
apply ssuccs prec; apply H.
Qed.
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5.5 Basic Results for Penetrator Strands
Lemma strand 1 node : ∀ n x, strand of n = [x] → smsg of n = x.
Proof.
intros n x Snx.
assert (H : List.In (smsg of n) [x]).
apply smsg in strand; auto.
elim H ; auto.
intro. elim H0.
Qed.
If n is a node of a MStrand or KStrand, then n is a positive node Lemma
MStrand xmit node :
∀ (n:node), MStrand (strand of n) → xmit n.
Proof.
unfold xmit.
intros n Ms. inversion Ms. ∃ (T t).
apply strand 1 node. auto.
Qed.
Lemma KStrand xmit node :
∀ (n:node), KStrand (strand of n) → xmit n.
Proof.
unfold xmit.
intros n Ms. inversion Ms. ∃ (K k).
apply strand 1 node. auto.
Qed.
If n is a node of a strand of lenght 3, the singed message of n is one of the 3
messages on the strand.
Lemma strand 3 nodes :
∀ n x y z, strand of n = [x;y;z] →
smsg of n = x ∨ smsg of n = y ∨ smsg of n = z.
Proof.
intros n x y z Sxyz.
assert (Lxyz : List.In (smsg of n) [x;y;z]) .
apply smsg in strand; auto.
elim Lxyz. auto.
intro Lyz. elim Lyz ; auto.
intro Lz. elim Lz ; auto.
intro Le. elim Le; auto.
Qed.
A function to extract the singed message of a positive node which lies on a strand
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of lenght 3 including only one positive node. Lemma strand 3 nodes nnp xmit :
∀ n x y z, strand of n = [-x;-y;+z] → xmit n → smsg of n = +z.
Proof.
intros n x y z Sxyz Xn.
assert (Hxyz : smsg of n = -x ∨ smsg of n = -y ∨ smsg of n = +z ).
apply strand 3 nodes. auto.
case Hxyz. intro. apply False ind. apply (xmit vs recv n).
auto. unfold recv; auto; ∃ x ; auto.
intros Hyz. case Hyz. intro. apply False ind. apply (xmit vs recv n).
auto. unfold recv; auto; ∃ y ; auto.
auto.
Qed.
A function to extract the singed message of a negative node which lies on a
strand of lenght 3.
Lemma strand 3 nodes nnp recv :
∀ n x y z, strand of n = [-x;-y;+z] → recv n →
smsg of n = -x ∨ smsg of n = -y.
Proof.
intros n x y z Sxyz Xn.
assert (Hxyz : smsg of n = -x ∨ smsg of n = -y ∨ smsg of n = +z ).
apply strand 3 nodes. auto.
case Hxyz. intro. left; auto.
intro Hyz. case Hyz. right; auto.
intro Hz. apply False ind. apply (xmit vs recv n).
unfold xmit. ∃ z ; auto. auto.
Qed.
A function to extract the singed message of a negative node which lies on a
strand of lenght 3 including only one negative node.
Lemma strand 3 nodes npp recv :
∀ n x y z, strand of n = [-x;+y;+z] → recv n →
smsg of n = -x.
Proof.
intros n x y z Sxyz Xn.
assert (Hxyz : smsg of n = -x ∨ smsg of n = +y ∨ smsg of n = +z ).
apply strand 3 nodes. auto.
case Hxyz. intro. auto.
intro Hyz. case Hyz. intro. apply False ind. apply (xmit vs recv n).
unfold xmit. ∃ y. auto. auto.
intro Hz. apply False ind. apply (xmit vs recv n).
unfold xmit. ∃ z ; auto. auto.
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Qed.
Lemma pair not ingred comp l : ∀ x y, ¬(P x y) <st x.
Proof.
intros x y Hingred.
assert (Hlt : size (P x y ) ≤ size x ).
apply ingred lt. auto.
assert (Hgt : size (P x y) > size x ).
simpl. apply size lt plus l. omega.
Qed.
Lemma pair not ingred comp r :
∀ x y, ¬(P x y) <st y.
Proof.
intros x y Hst.
assert (Hlt : size (P x y ) ≤ size y).
apply ingred lt. auto.
assert (Hgt : size (P x y) > size y).
simpl. rewrite (plus comm (size x ) (size y)).
apply size lt plus l. omega.
Qed.
Lemma enc not ingred comp l : ∀ x y, ¬(E x y) <st x.
Proof.
intros x y Hingred.
assert (Hlt : size (E x y ) ≤ size x ).
apply ingred lt. auto.
assert (Hgt : size (E x y) > size x ).
simpl. omega. omega.
Qed.
Lemma enc not ingred comp r :
∀ x y, ¬(E x y) <st (K y).
Proof.
intros x y Hst.
assert (Hlt : size (E x y ) ≤ size (K y)).
apply ingred lt. auto.
assert (Hgt : size (E x y) > size (K y)).
simpl. admit. omega.
Qed.
Lemma CStrand not falling :
∀ (s :strand), CStrand s →
¬ ∃ (n1 n2 : node), recv n1 ∧ xmit n2 ∧
strand of n1 = s ∧ strand of n2 = s ∧
ingred (msg of n2 ) (msg of n1 ).
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Proof.
intros s Hcs Hc.
destruct Hc as (n1,(n2,(Hre, (Hxmit,(Hs1,(Hs2,Hingred)))))).
inversion Hcs.
assert (Smn2 : smsg of n2 = + P g h).
apply strand 3 nodes nnp xmit with (x :=g) (y :=h).
congruence. auto.
assert (Mn2 : msg of n2 = P g h). unfold msg of. rewrite Smn2. auto.
assert (Smn1 : smsg of n1 = -g ∨ smsg of n1 = -h).
apply strand 3 nodes nnp recv with (x :=g) (y :=h) (z :=P g h).
congruence. auto.
case Smn1.
intro Sg. assert (Mn1 : msg of n1 = g). unfold msg of. rewrite Sg ; auto.
apply (pair not ingred comp l g h). rewrite Mn1, Mn2 in Hingred. auto.
intro Sh. assert (Mn1 : msg of n1 = h). unfold msg of. rewrite Sh; auto.
apply (pair not ingred comp r g h). rewrite Mn1, Mn2 in Hingred. auto.
Qed.
Lemma EStrand not falling :
∀ (s :strand), EStrand s →
¬ ∃ (n1 n2 : node), recv n1 ∧ xmit n2 ∧
strand of n1 = s ∧ strand of n2 = s ∧
ingred (msg of n2 ) (msg of n1 ).
Proof.
intros s Hes Hc.
destruct Hc as (n1,(n2,(Hre, (Hxmit,(Hs1,(Hs2,Hingred)))))).
inversion Hes.
assert (Smn2 : smsg of n2 = + E h k).
apply strand 3 nodes nnp xmit with (x :=K k) (y :=h).
congruence. auto.
assert (Mn2 : msg of n2 = E h k). unfold msg of. rewrite Smn2. auto.
assert (Smn1 : smsg of n1 = -K k ∨ smsg of n1 = -h).
apply strand 3 nodes nnp recv with (x :=K k) (y :=h) (z :=E h k).
congruence. auto.
case Smn1.
intro Sg. assert (Mn1 : msg of n1 = K k). unfold msg of. rewrite Sg ;
auto.
apply (enc not ingred comp r h k). rewrite Mn1, Mn2 in Hingred. auto.
intro Sh. assert (Mn1 : msg of n1 = h). unfold msg of. rewrite Sh; auto.
apply (enc not ingred comp l h k). rewrite Mn1, Mn2 in Hingred. auto.
Qed.
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5.5.1 A MStrand or KStrand cannot have an edge
Lemma strand 1 node index 0 :
∀ x s, strand of x = [s] → index of x = 0.
Proof.
intros [[xs xn] xp] s Snx. simpl in *.
rewrite Snx in xp. simpl in xp. omega.
Qed.
Lemma MStrand not edge :
∀ (s :strand), MStrand s → ¬ ∃ (x y : node),
strand of x = s ∧ strand of y = s ∧ ssuccs x y.
Proof.
intros s Ms (x ,(y, (Sx,(Sy, Sxy)))).
inversion Ms.
apply ssuccs acyclic with (n:=x ).
assert (Heq : x=y). apply eq nodes.
congruence. assert (index of x = 0).
apply strand 1 node index 0 with (s := +T t). congruence.
assert (index of y = 0).
apply strand 1 node index 0 with (s := +T t). congruence.
congruence. congruence.
Qed.
Lemma KStrand not edge :
∀ (s :strand), KStrand s → ¬ ∃ (n1 n2 : node),
strand of n1 = s ∧ strand of n2 = s ∧ ssuccs n1 n2.
Proof.
intros s Ms (x ,(y, (Sx,(Sy, Sxy)))).
inversion Ms.
apply ssuccs acyclic with (n:=x ).
assert (Heq : x=y). apply eq nodes.
congruence. assert (index of x = 0).
apply strand 1 node index 0 with (s := +K k). congruence.
assert (index of y = 0).
apply strand 1 node index 0 with (s := +K k). congruence.
congruence. congruence.
Qed.
5.5.2 A CStrand or SStrand cannot have a transformed
edge
Lemma CStrand not edge :
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∀ (s :strand), CStrand s → ¬ ∃ (x y : node) (a :msg),
strand of x = s ∧ strand of y = s ∧
recv x ∧ xmit y ∧ transformed edge x y a.
Admitted.
Axiom SStrand not edge :
∀ (s :strand), SStrand s → ¬ ∃ (x y : node) (a:msg),
strand of x = s ∧ strand of y = s ∧
recv x ∧ xmit y ∧ transformed edge x y a.
5.6 Every inhabited predicate has a prec-minimal
element
Theorem always min elt : ∀ P : node→ Prop,





unfold has min elt.
unfold is minimal.
apply (@well founded ind node prec (wf prec)
(fun x :node ⇒
P x → ∃ y :node, P y ∧ (∀ z :node, prec z y → ¬ (P z) ))).
intros.










apply not all ex not in H1.
destruct H1.
apply imply to and in H1.
destruct H1.
apply NNPP in H2.






Theorem prec is acyclic: ∀ (x :node), (prec x x ) → False.
Proof.
intros x H.
assert (has min elt (fun x ⇒ prec x x )).
apply always min elt.
∃ x ; auto.
unfold has min elt in H0.
destruct H0.
destruct H0.




5.7 Ingredients must originate
Section IngredientsOriginate.
Variable the m: msg.
Definition m ingred (n: node): Prop := ingred the m (msg of n).
If m is an ingredient somewhere then there is a minimal such place
Lemma
ingred min:
(∃ n:node, (m ingred n)) →
(∃ n:node, (is minimal m ingred n)).
Proof.
intros H.
apply always min elt; auto.
Qed.
Lemma smsg xmit msg :
∀ n m, smsg of(n) = (+ m) → msg of(n) = m.
Proof.
intros n m H.
unfold msg of. rewrite H. reflexivity.
Qed.
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Hint Resolve smsg xmit msg.
Lemma smsg recv msg :
∀ n m, smsg of(n) = (- m) → msg of(n) = m.
Proof.
intros n m H.
unfold msg of. rewrite H. reflexivity.
Qed.
Hint Resolve smsg recv msg.
Lemma msg deliver msg eq :
∀ x y, x --> y → msg of x = msg of y.
Proof.
intros x y edge.
destruct edge. destruct H as (H1, (H2, H3 )).
assert (msg of(x ) = m). apply smsg xmit msg. auto.
assert (msg of(y) = m). apply smsg recv msg. auto.
congruence.
Qed.
A minimal node can’t be a reception
Lemma
minimal not recv:





unfold is minimal in H.
destruct H.
assert (a1 : ∃ n1, msg deliver n1 n).
apply was sent; auto.
destruct a1.
assert (a2 : prec x n).
apply deliver prec; auto.
assert (a3 : ~(m ingred x)).
apply H1 ; auto.
assert (a4 : m ingred x ).
assert (a5 : msg of x = msg of n).
apply msg deliver msg eq. auto.
unfold m ingred.
unfold m ingred in H.




So, a minimal node must be a transmission




case (xmit or recv n). auto.
intro. apply False ind. apply (minimal not recv n); auto.
Qed.
Main result of this section: an ingredient must originate
Theorem
ingred originates 2:
(∃ n:node, (ingred the m (msg of n))) →
(∃ n:node, (orig at n the m)).
Proof.
intros.
assert (a1 : has min elt m ingred).
apply always min elt.
unfold m ingred; auto.
unfold orig at.
unfold has min elt in a1.
destruct a1.
assert (a0 : xmit x ).
apply minimal is xmit; auto.
unfold m ingred in H0.








assert (a1 : prec n’ x ).
apply ssuccs prec; auto.
revert H3.
unfold not in H1.




5.8 Extending two paths
Lemma path nth app left :
∀ p q n, n < length p → nth node n (p++q) = nth node n p.
Proof.
intros p q n. apply list nth app left.
Qed.
Lemma path nth app right :
∀ p q n, n ≥ length p → n < length (p++q) →
nth node n (p++q) = nth node (n-length p) q.
Proof.
intros p q n. apply list nth app right.
Qed.
Lemma length zero nil : ∀ (p : list node), length p = 0 → p = [].
Proof.
intros. induction p. auto. simpl in H. omega.
Qed.
Lemma path extend :
∀ (p : list node) (n:node) , is path p →
path edge (nth node (length p - 1) p) n → is path (p++[n]).
Proof.
intros p n Pp Pe.
unfold is path in *. intros i Hlt.
rewrite app length in Hlt. simpl in *.
assert ( i < length p - 1 ∨ i = length p - 1).
omega. case H.
intros. repeat rewrite path nth app left. apply Pp. auto. omega. omega.
intros.
assert (length p = 0 ∨ length p > 0). omega.
case H1. intros. rewrite (length zero nil p). rewrite app nil l. assert (i=0).
omega. rewrite H3. simpl. omega. auto.
intros. assert (i+1=length p). omega.
rewrite path nth app left. rewrite path nth app right. rewrite H3.
rewrite H0. rewrite minus diag. apply Pe. omega. rewrite app length.
simpl. omega. omega.
Qed.
Lemma comp of node imp ingred :




unfold comp of node in H.





Variable p : path.
Variable n : node.
Variable a t : msg.
Let lns := fst (split p).
Let lms := snd (split p).
Let n’ := nth node (length p - 1) lns.
Let t’ := nth msg (length p - 1) lms.
Lemma transpath extend :
is trans path p a → (path edge n’ n) ∨ (ssuccs n’ n ∧ xmit n’ ∧ xmit n) →
(t’ <[node] n’ ∧ (t’ = t ∨ (t’ 6=t → transformed edge n’ n a))) →
a <st t → a <st t’ →
((is trans path [(n’,t’); (n,t)] a ∧ orig at n’ a) ∨ is trans path (p++[(n,t)])
a).
Proof.





intro. left. unfold ln. rewrite list split fst.
apply path extend. auto. rewrite split length l. auto.
intros. destruct H1 as (H2, (H3, (H4, H5 ))). right. unfold nd.
unfold ln. repeat rewrite list split fst.
repeat rewrite path nth app left. split; auto.




Lemma comp trans : ∀ a L n, a <st L → L <[node] n → a <st (msg of n).
Proof.
intros a L n aL Ln.
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apply ingred trans with (y := L).
auto. apply comp of node imp ingred. auto.
Qed.
Hint Resolve comp trans.
Section Prop 11.
Variable a L : msg.
Variable n : node.
Definition P ingred : node → Prop:=
fun (n’ :node) ⇒ ssuccs n’ n ∧ ingred a (msg of n’ ).
Definition P comp : node → Prop :=
fun (n’ :node) ⇒ ssuccs n’ n ∧ L <[node] n’ ∧ a <st L.
Lemma P comp imp P ingred :




apply comp trans with (L:=L); apply Pcom.
Qed.
Lemma ingred of earlier :
a <st (msg of n) → xmit n → ¬ orig at n a → ∃ n’, P ingred n’.
Proof.








intros n1 Hssuc Hastn1. apply H.
∃ n1. split; auto.
Qed.
Lemma new at earlier :
a <st L → L <[node] n → ¬ new at L n → ∃ n’, P comp n’.
Proof.
intros aL Can Nan. apply Peirce. intros.
apply False ind. apply Nan.
split; auto. intros. apply H.




Lemma not orig exists :
a <st (msg of n) → xmit n → ¬ orig at n a → has min elt P ingred.
Proof.
intros Hxmit Hst Hnorig.
apply always min elt.
apply ingred of earlier; assumption.
Qed.
Hint Resolve not orig exists.
Lemma not new at exists :
a <st L → L <[node] n → ¬new at L n → has min elt P comp.
Proof.
intros aL Can Nan. apply always min elt.
apply new at earlier; auto.
Qed.
Lemma min xmit orig :
∀ (x :node), xmit x → is minimal P ingred x → orig at x a.
Proof.
intros. unfold orig at. destruct H0. unfold P ingred in H0.
repeat split. auto. apply H0.
intros. apply (H1 n’ ). apply ssuccs prec. auto.
unfold P ingred. split. apply ssuccs trans with (y :=x ).
auto. apply H0. auto.
Qed.
Lemma min new at :




intros. apply (H0 n’ ). apply ssuccs prec. auto.
split. apply ssuccs trans with (y :=x ).
auto. apply H. split; auto. apply H.
Qed.
Lemma eq strand trans :
∀ x y z, strand of x = strand of y → strand of y = strand of z →
strand of x = strand of z.
Proof.
intros x y z Sxy Syz.
congruence.
Qed.
Lemma not ssuccseq :
∀ (x y : node), ~(x ==>* y) → strand of x = strand of y → y ==>+ x.
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Proof.
intros x y N Sxy. apply index lt ssuccs. auto.
case lt dec with (m:= index of x ) (n:= index of y).
intro. omega.
intro. apply False ind. apply N. apply index lteq ssuccseq.
auto. omega.
Qed.
Lemma orig precede new at :
∀ x y, is minimal P ingred x → is minimal P comp y → ssuccseq x y.
Proof.
intros x y Pin Pcom.
apply Peirce. intros. assert (Syx : y ==>+ x ).
apply not ssuccseq. auto.
apply eq strand trans with (y :=n).
apply ssuccs same strand. apply Pin.
symmetry. apply ssuccs same strand. apply Pcom.
apply False ind. destruct Pin. apply (H1 y).




Lemma msg deliver same comp :
∀ x y Ly, msg deliver x y → Ly <[node] y →
∃ Lx, Lx <[node] x ∧ Lx = Ly.
Proof.
intros x y Ly Mxy Lyy.
∃ Ly. split. unfold comp of node.
assert (msg of x = msg of y).
apply msg deliver msg eq. auto.
rewrite H. auto. auto.
Qed.
For every atomic ingredient of a message, there exists a component of the message
so that the atomic value is an ingredient of that component Lemma ingred exists comp:
∀ m a, atomic a → a <st m → ∃ L, a <st L ∧ comp L m.
Proof.




assert (a = T t). apply atomic ingred eq; auto.
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subst. apply comp atomic cyclic; assumption.
∃ a; split.
constructor.
assert (a = K k). apply atomic ingred eq; auto.
subst. apply comp atomic cyclic; assumption.
assert (Hor : ingred a m1 ∨ ingred a m2 ).




assert (Hex : ∃ L : msg, ingred a L ∧ comp L m1 ).
exact (IHm1 Hst). destruct Hex as (L, (HaL, Hcom)).
∃ L; split.
assumption.
apply preserve comp l; assumption.
intros Hst.
assert (Hex : ∃ L : msg, ingred a L ∧ comp L m2 ).
exact (IHm2 Hst). destruct Hex as (L, (HaL, Hcom)).
∃ L; split.
assumption.
apply preserve comp r; assumption.
assert (Hex : ∃ L : msg, a <st L ∧ L <com m).
apply IHm. apply ingred enc with (k :=k).
inversion Hatom; discriminate.
assumption.
destruct Hex as (L, (HaL, Hcom)).
∃ (E m k); split.
assumption.
apply comp simple cyclic.
apply simple step. unfold not. intros Hpair.
inversion Hpair.
Qed.
Lemma ingred exists comp of node:
∀ (n:node) (a:msg), atomic a → a <st (msg of n)
→ ∃ L, a <st L ∧ L <[node] n.
Proof.
intros.
apply ingred exists comp; assumption.
Qed.
Lemma msg deliver comp :
∀ (n1 n2 :node) (m:msg),
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msg deliver n1 n2 ∧
comp of node m n2 → comp of node m n1.
Proof.
intros.
destruct H as (H1,H2 ).
unfold comp of node.
assert (msg of n1 = msg of n2 ).
apply msg deliver msg eq. auto.
rewrite H.
unfold comp of node in H2. auto.
Qed.
Hint Resolve msg deliver comp.
Lemma new at imp comp : ∀ m n, new at m n → m <[node] n.
Proof.
intros m n H.
unfold new at in H.
apply H.
Qed.
Lemma orig dec : ∀ n a, orig at n a ∨ ¬ orig at n a.
Proof. intros; tauto. Qed.
Lemma new at dec : ∀ (n:node) (L:msg) , new at L n ∨ ¬new at L n.
Proof.
intros n L. tauto.
Qed.




Lemma orig precede :
∀ (x y : node) (a Ly : msg), atomic a → orig at x a →
a <st Ly → Ly <[node] y → strand of x = strand of y → ssuccseq x y.
Proof.
intros x y a Ly Atom Oxa aLy Lyy Sxy.
apply Peirce. intros. assert (Syx : y ==>+ x ).
apply not ssuccseq; auto. apply False ind.
destruct Oxa as ( , ( , Contra)).
apply Contra with (n’ :=y). auto.
apply comp trans with (L:=Ly); auto.
Qed.
Lemma ssuccseq imp eq or ssuccs :
∀ x y, ssuccseq x y → x = y ∨ ssuccs x y.
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Proof.
intros x y Sxy. induction Sxy.











Variable a L: msg.
Variable n : node.
Lemma backward construction :
atomic a → a <st L → L <[node] n → ¬ orig at n a →
∃ (n’ :node) (L’ :msg), (path edge n’ n ∨ (ssuccs n’ n ∧ xmit n’ ∧ xmit n ∧
orig at n’ a)) ∧
(a <st L’ ∧ L’ <[node] n’ ∧ (L’ = L ∨ (L’ 6=L → transformed edge n’ n
a))).
Proof.
intros Hatom Hcom Hst Norig.
case (xmit or recv n).
Focus 2. intros Hrecv.
assert (Hex : ∃ (n’ :node), msg deliver n’ n).
apply was sent. auto.
destruct Hex as (n’, Hmsg deli).
∃ n’ ; ∃ L.
split. left. apply path edge single. auto.
split. exact Hcom.




assert (Hmin : has min elt (P ingred a n)).
apply not orig exists. apply comp trans with (L:= L); auto. auto. auto.
destruct Hmin as (n’, Hm).
case (xmit or recv n’ ).
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intros Xn’.
assert (Orign : orig at n’ a).
apply min xmit orig with (n:=n); auto.
assert (Cn’ : ∃ L’, a <st L’ ∧ L’ <[node] n’ ).
apply ingred exists comp of node. auto.
apply orig imp ingred; auto. destruct Cn’ as (L’, (aL’, L’n’ )).
case (new at dec n L).
intros NLn.
∃ n’, L’. split. right. split. destruct Hm. apply H. auto.
split. auto. split. auto. case (eq msg dec L’ L). auto.
intros. right. intros. split. apply Hm. split; auto. ∃ n, L.
split. apply Hm. split. apply rt refl. split; auto.
intros NNLn.
assert (Hmin : has min elt (P comp a L n)).
apply not new at exists; auto.
destruct Hmin as (z, (H1, H2 )).
assert (Sn’z : ssuccseq n’ z ).
apply orig precede with (a:=a) (Ly :=L); auto.
apply H1. apply eq strand trans with (y :=n).
apply ssuccs same strand; auto. apply Hm. symmetry.
apply ssuccs same strand. apply H1.
case (ssuccseq imp eq or ssuccs n’ z ); auto.
intros Eqn’z.
∃ n’, L.
split. right. split. apply Hm. split; auto.
split; auto. split. subst. apply H1. left. auto.
intros SSn’z.
∃ n’, L’. split. right. split; auto. apply Hm.
split; auto. split. auto.
right. intros Neq. split. apply Hm. split; auto.
∃ z, L. split; auto. split. apply ssuccs imp ssuccseq. apply H1.
split. apply min new at with (a:=a) (n:=n). split; auto. split;
auto.
intros Hrecv.
assert (Cn’ : ∃ L’, a <st L’ ∧ L’ <[node] n’ ).
apply ingred exists comp of node. auto.
apply Hm. destruct Cn’ as (L’, (aL’, L’n’ )).
case (new at dec n L).
intros NLn.
∃ n’, L’. split. left. apply path edge double. split; auto. apply Hm.
split; auto. split. auto. right.
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intros Neq. split. apply Hm. split; auto. ∃ n, L.
split. apply Hm. split. apply rt refl. split. auto. split; auto.
intros NNLn.
assert (Hmin : has min elt (P comp a L n)).
apply not new at exists; auto.
destruct Hmin as (z, (H1, H2 )).
assert (Sn’z : ssuccseq n’ z ).
apply orig precede new at with (a:=a) (L:=L) (n:=n). auto.
split; auto.
case (ssuccseq imp eq or ssuccs n’ z ); auto.
intros Eqn’z.
∃ n’, L.
split. left. apply path edge double; auto.
split. apply Hm. split; auto.
split; auto. split. subst. apply H1. left. auto.
intros SSn’z.
∃ n’, L’. split. left. apply path edge double; auto.
split; auto. apply Hm. split; auto.
split. auto.
right. intros Neq. split. apply Hm. split; auto.
∃ z, L. split; auto. split. apply ssuccs imp ssuccseq. apply H1.
split.




Definition not proper subterm (t :msg) :=
∃ (n’ : node) (L : msg),
t <st L → t 6= L → r node n’ → L <[node] n’ → False.
Definition r comp (L:msg) (n:node) := L <[node] n ∧ r node n.
Definition not constant tp (p:path) :=
(nth msg 0 (lm p)) 6= (nth msg (length p - 1) (lm p)).
Definition largest index (p:path) (i :nat) :=
not constant tp p ∧ i < length p - 1 ∧
nth msg i (lm p) 6= nth msg (i+1) (lm p) ∧
∀ j, j < length p → j > i →
nth msg j (lm p) = nth msg (length p - 1) (lm p).
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Definition smallest index (p:path) (i :nat) :=
not constant tp p ∧ i < length p - 1 ∧
nth msg i (lm p) 6= nth msg (i+1) (lm p) ∧
∀ j, j ≤ i → nth msg j (lm p) = nth msg 0 (lm p).
Lemma largest index imp eq last :
∀ p i j, largest index p i → j < length p → j > i →
nth msg j (lm p) = nth msg (length p - 1) (lm p).
Proof.
intros.
apply H ; auto.
Qed.
Lemma not constant exists :
∀ p, not constant tp p → ∃ i, i < length p - 1 →
nth msg i (lm p) 6= nth msg (i+1) (lm p).
Admitted.
Lemma not constant exists smallest :
∀ p, not constant tp p → ∃ i, smallest index p i.
Admitted.
Lemma not constant exists largest :
∀ p, not constant tp p → ∃ i, largest index p i.
Admitted.
Lemma strand length 3 :
∀ (s :strand) (x y z : smsg), s = [x;y;z] → length s = 3.
Proof.
intros. unfold length. subst. auto.
Qed.
Lemma DS exists key :
∀ y h k k’, DStrand (strand of y) → msg of y = E h k → inv k k’ →
∃ x, ssuccs x y ∧ msg of x = K k’.
Admitted.
Lemma DS node 0 :
∀ x, DStrand (strand of x ) → index of x = 0 → ∃ k, msg of x = K k.
Admitted.
Lemma DS node 1 :
∀ x, DStrand (strand of x ) → (∃ h k, msg of x = E h k) → index of x = 1.
Admitted.
Lemma msg of nth :





This chapter contains the proofs of all propositions needed for authentication tets.
Require Import Strand Spaces Message Algebra Strand Library.
Require Import Lists.List Relation Definitions Relation Operators.
Require Import List Library.
Import ListNotations.
6.1 Proposition 6
A destructive path that enters decryption strands only through D-cyphertext edges
is falling [6].
Lemma P6 1 : ∀ p, des path not key p → falling path p.
Proof.
intros p Dp. destruct Dp.
split. apply H.
intros i Hlt. destruct H as (pp, H ). destruct pp.
unfold is path in H1.
assert (path edge (nth node i p) (nth node (i + 1) p)).
apply (H1 i); auto. inversion H3.
assert (msg of (nth node i p) = msg of (nth node (i+1) p)).
apply msg deliver msg eq with (y :=nth node (i+1) p). auto.
rewrite H5. apply ingred refl. destruct H4 as (H5, (H6, H7 )).
Admitted.
A constructive path that enters encryption strands only through E-plaintext
edges is rising [6]




The sequence of penetrator strands traversed on a falling path is constrained by the
structure of term(p1).
Section P7 1.
Variable i : nat.
Variable p : list node.
Let p i := nth node i p.
Let p i1 := nth node (i+1) p.
Hypothesis Hc : 0 < i ∧ i < length p - 1.
Hypothesis Hfp : falling path p.
Hypothesis Hrec : recv p i.
Hypothesis Hpn : p node p i.
Let s := strand of p i.
Lemma path edge pi pi1 : path edge p i p i1.
Proof.
destruct Hfp as (Hp, ). destruct Hp as (P, ).
unfold is path in P.
apply (P i); apply Hc.
Qed.
Lemma P7 1 aux1 : xmit p i1 ∧ strand of p i1 = strand of p i.
Proof.
assert (Pe : path edge p i p i1 ).
apply path edge pi pi1; auto.
inversion Pe. apply False ind. apply xmit vs recv with (n:=p i).
apply msg deliver xmit with (y :=p i1 ). auto. auto.
split. apply H.
destruct H. symmetry. apply ssuccs same strand. auto.
Qed.
Lemma pi1 ingred pi : msg of p i1 <st msg of p i.
Proof.
destruct Hfp. apply (H0 i). apply Hc.
Qed.
Lemma P7 1 aux : DStrand (strand of p i) ∨ SStrand (strand of p i).
Proof.
assert (Ps : PenetratorStrand s). apply Hpn.
inversion Ps.
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apply False ind. apply xmit vs recv with (n:=p i).
apply MStrand xmit node; auto. auto.
apply False ind. apply xmit vs recv with (n:=p i).
apply KStrand xmit node; auto. auto.
apply False ind. apply (CStrand not falling s) ; auto.
∃ p i, p i1. split; auto. split. apply P7 1 aux1.
split; auto. split. apply P7 1 aux1. apply pi1 ingred pi.
auto.
apply False ind. apply False ind. apply (EStrand not falling s) ; auto.
∃ p i, p i1. split; auto. split. apply P7 1 aux1.
split; auto. split. apply P7 1 aux1. apply pi1 ingred pi.
auto.
Qed.
Section P7 1 a.
Variable h : msg.
Variable k : Key .
Hypothesis Heq : msg of p i = E h k.
Lemma P7 1a :
DStrand s ∧ msg of p i1 = h.
Proof.
case P7 1 aux.
intro Ds. split; auto.
inversion Ds.
assert (Smpi : smsg of p i = - K k’ ∨ smsg of p i = - E h0 k0 ).
apply strand 3 nodes nnp recv with (z :=h0 ); auto.
case Smpi. intro Kk. assert (msg of p i = K k’ ).
unfold msg of. rewrite Kk ; auto. rewrite H1 in Heq. discriminate.
intro. assert (msg of p i = E h0 k0 ). unfold msg of; rewrite H1 ; auto.
rewrite Heq in H2. assert (h=h0 ∧ k = k0 ). apply ((enc free h k h0 k0 ));
auto.
destruct H3 ; subst.
apply node smsg msg xmit.
apply strand 3 nodes nnp xmit with (x := K k’ ) (y :=E h0 k0 ).
assert (strand of p i1 = strand of p i). apply P7 1 aux1. congruence.
apply P7 1 aux1.
intro. inversion H.
assert (smsg of p i = - P g h0 ).
apply strand 3 nodes npp recv with (y := g) (z :=h0 ). auto. auto.
assert (msg of p i= P g h0 ). apply node smsg msg recv; auto.
rewrite H2 in Heq. discriminate.
Qed.
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End P7 1 a.
Section P7 1 b.
Variable g h : msg.
Lemma P7 1 b :
SStrand s ∧ (msg of p i1 = h ∨ msg of p i1 = g).
Admitted.
End P7 1 b.
End P7 1.
6.3 Proposition 10
This lemma states that if (p, L) is a transformation path in which Li 6= Li+1, and pi
is a penetrator node, then pi ⇒+ pi+1 lies either on a D-strand or an E-strand [6].
Section Proposition 10.
Variable p : path.
Variable n : nat.
Variable a : msg.
Hypothesis Htp : is trans path p a.
Hypothesis Hn : n < length p - 1.
Hypothesis Hcom : L p n 6= L p (n+1).
Hypothesis Pnode : p node (nd p n).
Lemma trans path ssuccs :
ssuccs (nd p n) (nd p (n+1)).
Proof.
destruct Htp as (H2, (H3,H4 )).
destruct (H4 n)as (H41, H42 ).
destruct H42. auto.
apply False ind. apply Hcom. auto.
destruct H. auto.
destruct H0 as (m,(Hxmit,(Hnew,(Hssuc,Hsseq)))).
auto.
Qed.
Lemma Prop10 recv xmit : recv (nd p n) ∧ xmit (nd p (n+1)).
Admitted.
Lemma Proposition 10 : ssuccs (nd p n) (nd p (n+1)) ∧
(DStrand (strand of (nd p n)) ∨ EStrand (strand of (nd p n))).
Proof.
destruct Htp as (Ha, (Ha’, Hb)).
destruct (Hb n) as (Q1,Q2 ).
66
split.
apply trans path ssuccs.
assert (Hp : PenetratorStrand (strand of (nd p n))).
apply (P node strand (nd p n)); auto.
elim Hp.
intro. apply False ind. apply (MStrand not edge (strand of (nd p n))).
auto.
∃ (nd p n).
∃ (nd p (n+1)).
split. auto.
split. symmetry. apply ssuccs same strand. apply trans path ssuccs.
apply trans path ssuccs.
intro. apply False ind. apply (KStrand not edge (strand of (nd p n))).
auto.
∃ (nd p n).
∃ (nd p (n+1)).
split. auto.
split. symmetry. apply ssuccs same strand; apply trans path ssuccs.
apply trans path ssuccs.
intro. apply False ind. apply (CStrand not edge (strand of (nd p n))).
auto.
∃ (nd p n),(nd p (n+1)), a.
split. auto.
split. symmetry. apply ssuccs same strand. apply trans path ssuccs.
split. apply Prop10 recv xmit.
split. apply Prop10 recv xmit.
case (Q2 Hn). intro. apply False ind. apply Hcom. auto.
intro. apply (H0 Hcom).
intro. apply False ind. apply (SStrand not edge (strand of (nd p n))).
auto.
∃ (nd p n),(nd p (n+1)), a.
split. auto.
split. symmetry. apply ssuccs same strand. apply trans path ssuccs.
split. apply Prop10 recv xmit.
split. apply Prop10 recv xmit.
case (Q2 Hn). intro. apply False ind. apply Hcom. auto.







This propositions states that given a node such that an atomic message a is an
ingredient of the node’s message, it is possible to construct a transformation path
so that the atomic value is originated at the first node of the path and the given
node is the last node of the path.
Section Proposition 11.
Lemma single node tp :
∀ (n:node) (m a:msg),
atomic a → a <st m → m <[node] n → is trans path [(n,m)] a.
Proof.
intros n m a Atom Ingred Hcom.
unfold is trans path.
simpl. split. left. unfold is path. simpl. intros i Hcontra.
apply False ind; omega.
split. auto.
intros n0. split. intro Hn0. assert (n0=0). omega. rewrite H.
assert ( L [(n,m)] 0 = m). auto.
assert (nd [(n,m)] 0 = n). auto.
split; congruence.
intros n1.
apply False ind. omega.
Qed.
Lemma single node not traverse key :
∀ (n:node) (m a : msg), atomic a → a <st m → m <[node] n →
is trans path [(n,m)] a → not traverse key [(n,m)].
Proof.
intros.
unfold not traverse key. intros.
simpl in H3. omega.
Qed.
Definition p11 aux (n:node) (a t : msg) p : Prop :=
let ln := fst (split p) in
let lm := snd (split p) in
is trans path p a ∧
orig at (nth node 0 ln) a ∧
nth node (length p - 1) ln = n ∧
nth msg (length p -1) lm = t ∧
∀ (i :nat), i < length p → a <st (nth msg i lm) ∧
not traverse key p.
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Definition p11 aux2 (n:node): Prop :=
∀ (a t : msg), atomic a → a <st t → t <[node] n →
∃ p, p11 aux n a t p.
Lemma tpath extend :
∀ x a t, a <st t → t <[node] x →
(∃ (x’ :node) (t’ :msg), (path edge x’ x ∨ (ssuccs x’ x ∧ xmit x’ ∧ xmit x ∧
orig at x’ a)) ∧
(a <st t’ ∧ t’ <[node] x’ ∧ (t’ = t ∨ (t’ 6=t → transformed edge x’ x a))) ∧
∃ p, p11 aux x’ a t’ p) →
∃ p, p11 aux x a t p.
Proof.
Admitted.
Lemma Prop 11 : ∀ (n’ : node) , p11 aux2 n’.
Proof.
apply well founded ind with (R:=prec).
exact wf prec .
intros x IH.
intros a t Sat Atoma Stx.
assert (Orig : orig at x a ∨ ¬ orig at x a). tauto.
case Orig.
intros Oxa. ∃ ([(x, t)]). split.
apply single node tp with (n:=x ) (m:=t); auto.
split; auto. split; auto. split; auto.
intros. simpl in H. assert (i=0). omega.
split. rewrite H0 ;auto. apply single node not traverse key with (a:=a);
auto.
apply single node tp with (n:=x ) (m:=t); auto.
intro NOrig. case (xmit or recv x ).
Focus 2. intro Recvx. assert (∃ y, msg deliver y x ).
apply was sent; auto. apply tpath extend ; auto. destruct H as (y, Dyx ).
∃ y, t. split. left. apply path edge single. auto.
split. split. auto. split. apply msg deliver comp with (n2 :=x ).
split; auto. left; auto. apply IH. apply deliver prec; auto. auto.
auto. apply msg deliver comp with (n2 :=x ). split; auto.
intros.
assert (∃ (x’ :node) (t’ :msg),
(path edge x’ x ∨ (ssuccs x’ x ∧ xmit x’ ∧ xmit x ∧ orig at x’ a)) ∧
(a <st t’ ∧ t’ <[node] x’ ∧ (t’ = t ∨ (t’ 6=t → transformed edge x’ x
a)))).
apply backward construction; auto. destruct H0 as (y, (Ly, (H1, H2 ))).
apply tpath extend ; auto. ∃ y, Ly. split. apply H1.
split. apply H2.
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apply IH. case H1.
intro. apply path edge prec. auto.
intro. apply ssuccs prec. apply H0.





Variable pl : path.
Let p := fst (split pl).
Let l := snd (split pl).
Hypothesis Hpp : p path p.
Hypothesis Hp1 : simple (msg of (nth node 0 p)).
Lemma Prop13 :
∀ (i :nat), i < length p - 1 →
∃ (j :nat), (j ≤ i ∧ msg of (nth node j p) = nth msg i l).
Admitted.
Definition P13 1 aux (n:nat) : Prop :=
msg of (nth node n p) = (nth msg (length p - 1) l) ∧
∀ (i :nat), i ≥ n → i ≤ length p - 1 →
nth msg i l = nth msg (length p - 1) l.
Lemma P13 1 :
∃ (n:nat), P13 1 aux n ∧
(∀ m, m > n → ¬ P13 1 aux m) ∧
∃ i, i < length p - 1 → nth msg i l 6= nth msg (i+1) l →




This lemma states that either a penetrable key is already penetrated, or some regular
principal puts it in a form that could allow it to be penetrated. In fact, any key
that becoms available to the penetrator in any bundle is a member of PKeys [6].
Section P17.
Definition Prop17 aux (n:node) : Prop :=
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∀ (k : Key), msg of n = K k → PKeys k.
Lemma Prop17 : ∀ (n:node), Prop17 aux n.
Proof.
apply well founded ind with (R:=prec).
exact wf prec .





Variable p : path.
Variable a : msg.
Hypothesis t path: is trans path p a.
Hypothesis no key : not traverse key p.
Hypothesis p1 : r node (nth node 0 (ln p)).
Hypothesis lp : r node (nth node (length p - 1) (ln p)).
Hypothesis nconst : (nth msg 0 (lm p)) 6= (nth msg (length p - 1) (lm p)).
Section P18 1.
Variable h1 : msg.
Variable k1 k1’ : Key .
Hypothesis enc form : nth msg 0 (lm p) = E h1 k1.
Hypothesis key pair : inv k1 k1’.
Hypothesis not pen : ¬PKeys k1’.
Hypothesis not subterm : not proper subterm (nth msg 0 (lm p)).
Lemma Prop18 1 :
∀ n, smallest index p n →
r node (nth node n (ln p)) ∧
transforming edge for (nth node n (ln p)) (nth node (n+1) (ln p)) a.
Proof.
intros n Sm.
split. unfold r node. intro pn.
destruct Sm as (nc, (S1, (S2, S3 ))).
assert (ssuccs (nd p n) (nd p (n+1)) ∧
(DStrand (strand of (nd p n)) ∨ EStrand (strand of (nd p n)))).
apply Proposition 10 with (a:=a); auto.
destruct H.
case H0.
intro ds. apply not pen.
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assert (nth msg n (lm p) = E h1 k1 ). rewrite ← enc form. apply S3. auto.
assert (∃ x, ssuccs x (nd p n) ∧ msg of x = K k1’ ).
apply DS exists key with (h:=h1 ) (k :=k1 ). auto.
rewrite ← H1. apply msg of nth. omega. auto.
destruct H2 as (x, (H2, H3 )).






Variable hp : msg.
Variable kp kp’ : Key .
Hypothesis enc form : nth msg (length p - 1) (lm p)= E hp kp.
Hypothesis key pair : inv kp kp’.
Hypothesis not pen : ¬PKeys kp’.
Hypothesis not subterm : not proper subterm (nth msg (length p - 1) (lm p)).
Lemma Prop18 2 :
∀ n, largest index p n →
r node (nth node n (ln p)) ∧







This chapter contains the proofs of the two authentication tests, outgoing test and
incoming test, which are the main results of this project.
Require Import Strand Spaces Strand Library Message Algebra
Authentication Tests Library.
7.1 Definitions
7.1.1 Test component and test
Tests can use their test components in at least two different ways. If the uniquely
originating value is sent in encrypted form, and the challenge is to decrypt it, then
that is an outgoing test. If it is received back in encrypted form, and the challenge
is to produce that encrypted form, then that is an incoming test [6]. These two
kinds of test are illustrated in Figure 7.1.
Definition test component (a t : msg) (n:node) : Prop :=
(∃ h k, t = E h k) ∧ a <st t ∧ t <[node] n ∧ not proper subterm t.
Definition test (x y : node) (a : msg) : Prop :=
unique a ∧ orig at x a ∧ transformed edge for x y a.
7.1.2 Incoming test
Definition incoming test (x y : node) (a t : msg) : Prop :=
(∃ h k, t = E h k ∧ ¬ PKeys k) ∧ test x y a ∧ test component a t y.
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Figure 7.1: Outgoing and Incoming Tests
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Outgoing test Definition outgoing test (x y : node) (a t : msg) : Prop :=
(∃ h k k’, t = E h k ∧ inv k k’ ∧ ¬ PKeys k’) ∧
test x y a ∧ test component a t x.
7.2 Some basic results
Below are some basic results following directly form the definitions for test, test
component, outgoing test, and incoming test.
7.2.1 Unique




Hint Resolve test imp unique.
Lemma incoming test imp unique :




Hint Resolve incoming test imp unique.
Lemma outgoing test imp unique :




Hint Resolve outgoing test imp unique.
7.2.2 Transformed edge
Lemma test imp trans edge :




Hint Resolve test imp trans edge.
Lemma incoming test imp trans edge :





Hint Resolve incoming test imp trans edge.
Lemma outgoing test imp trans edge :




Hint Resolve outgoing test imp trans edge.




Hint Resolve test imp orig.
Lemma incoming test imp orig :




Hint Resolve incoming test imp orig.
Lemma outgoing test imp orig :




Hint Resolve outgoing test imp orig.
7.2.3 Ingredient
Lemma tc ingred : ∀ a t n, test component a t n → a <st t.
Proof.
intros a t n Tc.
apply Tc.
Qed.
Hint Resolve tc ingred.
7.2.4 Incoming test (outging test) implies test component
Lemma incoming test imp tc :
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Hint Resolve incoming test imp tc.
Lemma outgoing test imp tc :




Hint Resolve outgoing test imp tc.
Component Lemma tc comp : ∀ a t n, test component a t n → t <[node] n.
Proof.
intros a t n Tc.
apply Tc.
Qed.
Hint Resolve tc comp.
Lemma outgoing test comp :
∀ x y a t, outgoing test x y a t → t <[node] x.
Proof.
intros. apply tc comp with (a:=a).
apply outgoing test imp tc with (y :=y).
auto.
Qed.
Hint Resolve outgoing test comp.
Lemma incoming test comp :
∀ x y a t, incoming test x y a t → t <[node] y.
Proof.
intros. apply tc comp with (a:=a).
apply incoming test imp tc with (x :=x ).
auto.
Qed.
Hint Resolve incoming test comp.
Others Lemma unique orig :
∀ x y a, unique a → orig at x a → orig at y a → x = y.
Proof.
intros. destruct H. apply (H2 x y); auto.
Qed.
Lemma transpath not constant :
∀ p a, is trans path p a →
77
transformed edge for (nth node 0 (ln p)) (nth node (length p - 1) (ln p)) a →
not constant tp p.
Admitted.
Lemma ssuccs both r nodes :
∀ x y, ssuccs x y → r node x → r node y.
Proof.
intros.
unfold r node in *. unfold p node in *.
rewrite (ssuccs same strand x y) in H0 ; auto.
Qed.
Lemma trans ef imp ssuccs :




Hint Resolve trans ef imp ssuccs.
Lemma tp comp :
∀ p a i, is trans path p a → i < length p →
nth msg i (lm p) <[node] nth node i (ln p).
Proof.
intros. apply H. auto.
Qed.
Lemma tf edge exists :
∀ x y a, transformed edge for x y a →
∃ Ly, a <st Ly ∧ Ly <[node] y.
Proof.
intros.





Variable n n’ : node.
Variable a t : msg.
Hypothesis Atom : atomic a.
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7.3.1 Outgoing test
If a regular pricipal sends out a messages in encrypted form, the original component,
and sometime later receives it back in a new component. Then we can conclude that
there exists a regular transforming edge. The meaning of this test is illusrated in
the Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Authentication provided by an Outgoing Test
Theorem Authentication test1 :
outgoing test n n’ a t →
∃ m m’, r node m ∧ r node m’ ∧ t <[node] m ∧
transforming edge for m m’ a.
Proof.
intros.
assert (p11 aux2 n’ ).
apply Prop 11.
assert (Ha : ∃ t’, a <st t’ ∧ t’ <[node] n’ ).
apply tf edge exists with (x :=n).
apply outgoing test imp trans edge with (t :=t). auto.
destruct Ha as (t’, (Hst, Hcomp)).
destruct (H0 a t’ ); auto.
destruct H1. destruct H2 as (H2, (H3, (H4, H5 ))).
assert (nth node 0 (ln x ) = n).
apply unique orig with (a:=a).
apply outgoing test imp unique with (x :=n) (y :=n’ ) (t :=t). auto.
apply H2. apply outgoing test imp orig with (y :=n’ ) (t :=t). auto.
assert (not constant tp x ).
apply transpath not constant with (a:=a). auto.
apply outgoing test imp trans edge with (t :=t).
unfold ln in *. rewrite H3. rewrite H6. auto.
assert (∃ i, smallest index x i).
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apply not constant exists smallest. auto.
destruct H8 as (i, H8 ).
∃ (nth node i (ln x )), (nth node (i+1) (ln x )).
assert (r node (nth node i (ln x )) ∧
transforming edge for (nth node i (ln x )) (nth node (i + 1) (ln x )) a).
apply Prop18 1 . apply H8. destruct H8 as (H8, (H81, (H82, H83 ))).
split. apply H9.
split. apply ssuccs both r nodes with (x := nth node i (ln x )).
apply trans ef imp ssuccs with (a:=a); apply H9. apply H9.
split. assert (nth msg i (snd (List.split x )) =
nth msg 0 (snd (List.split x ))).
apply H83. omega.
assert (nth msg 0 (lm x ) = t). admit. unfold lm in H11. rewrite H11 in H10.
unfold ln. rewrite ← H10.
apply tp comp with (a:=a). auto. omega. apply H9.
Qed.
7.3.2 Incoming test
Incoming tests can be used to infer the existence of a regular transforming edge in
protocols in which the nonce is emitted in paintext, and later received in cnrypted
form [6].
Figure 7.3: Authentication provided by an Incoming Test
Theorem Authentication test2 :
incoming test n n’ a t →
∃ m m’, r node m ∧ r node m’ ∧ t <[node] m’ ∧




assert (p11 aux2 n’ ).
apply Prop 11. destruct (H0 a t). auto.
apply tc ingred with (n:=n’ ).
apply incoming test imp tc with (x :=n). auto.
apply incoming test comp with (x :=n) (a:=a). auto.
destruct H1. destruct H2 as (H2, (H3, (H4, H5 ))).
assert (nth node 0 (ln x ) = n).
apply unique orig with (a:=a).
apply incoming test imp unique with (x :=n) (y :=n’ ) (t :=t). auto.
apply H2. apply incoming test imp orig with (y :=n’ ) (t :=t). auto.
assert (not constant tp x ).
apply transpath not constant with (a:=a). auto.
apply incoming test imp trans edge with (t :=t).
unfold ln in *. rewrite H3. rewrite H6. auto.
assert (∃ i, largest index x i).
apply not constant exists largest. auto.
destruct H8 as (i, H8 ).
∃ (nth node i (ln x )), (nth node (i+1) (ln x )).
assert (r node (nth node i (ln x )) ∧
transforming edge for (nth node i (ln x )) (nth node (i + 1) (ln x )) a).
apply Prop18 2 . apply H8. destruct H8 as (H8, (H81, (H82, H83 ))).
split. apply H9.
split. apply ssuccs both r nodes with (x := nth node i (ln x )).
apply trans ef imp ssuccs with (a:=a); apply H9. apply H9.
split. assert (nth msg (i+1) (snd (List.split x )) =
nth msg (length x - 1) (snd (List.split x ))).
apply H83. omega. omega.
rewrite H4 in H10. unfold ln. rewrite ← H10.





Conclusion and Future Work
I successfully formalized strand spaces in Coq, and had the proofs for the two au-
thentication tests with some incomplete proofs. To accomplish these, I implemented
6 modules as following.
1. Message Algebra: formalization of possible messages which can be exchanged
between principals in a protocol.
2. Strand Spaces: formalization of node, strand, penetrator strand, edges, etc.
3. Strand Library: many basic results of strand spaces, which are used to prove
the authentication tests
4. Authentication Library: the proofs of all propositions needed for proving au-
thentication tests
5. List Library: some basic results about lists not found in the standard Coq List
library
6. Authentication Tests: the proofs of the two main theorems
8.1 Future Work
This section describes the possible future work that can be done based on the project.
We already have a framework, strand space formalization, for specifying and
verifying cryptographic protocols in general. One potential project following this
one is to specify and verify some particular protocols like Otway-Rees, Woo-Lam,
Newman-Stubblebine, then apply ”Authentication Tests” to prove some specific
security goals of these protocols.
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When formalizing strand spaces in Coq, I encountered a lot of design choices
and I had to decide which option to use, for example, inductive definitions (starting
with ”Fixpoint” in Coq) and deductive definitions (starting with ”Definition” in
Coq), variable and parameter. Each design choice has some advantages and some
disadvantages. So the answer to which one is better depends on the usages of it
later.
We can use Coq to extract programs from proofs. So we can use this Coq’s facility
to extract the programs of cryptographic protocols, and then use such programs to
synthesize protocol implementations. It is a good way to detect the protocol failures
or protocol errors.
Due to the limit of time and the difficulties of proving authentication tests, some
propositions on the authentications test library were not completed. These lemmas
are verified carefully in paper proofs. However, proving remaining lemmas in Coq
will strengthen the correctness of authentication tests.
83
Bibliography
[1] The coq reference manual. https://coq.inria.fr/distrib/current/
refman/, 2009.
[2] Zanella Bguelin Barthe Gilles, Grgoire Benjamin. swmath website. http://
www.swmath.org/software/9443, March 2015.
[3] Yves Bertot and Pierre Caste´ran. Coqart. by Springer-Verlag, 2004.
[4] Sebastien Briais. A formalization of spi calculus in Coq. http://sbriais.free.
fr/talks/talk_msr.pdf, November 2007. A talk in INRIA-Microsoft Research,
Orsay, FRANCE.
[5] F Javier Thayer Fa´brega, Jonathan C Herzog, and Joshua D Guttman. Strand
spaces: Proving security protocols correct. Journal of computer security,
7(2):191–230, 1999.
[6] Joshua D Guttman and F Javier Thayer. Authentication tests and the structure
of bundles. Theoretical computer science, 283(2):333–380, 2002.
[7] INRIA Sophia-Antipolis Mditerrane IMDEA Software Institute. Certicrypt web-
site. http://certicrypt.gforge.inria.fr/, March 2015.
[8] Christine Paulin-Mohring. Introduction to the coq proof-assistant for practical
software verification. In Tools for Practical Software Verification, pages 45–95.
Springer, 2012.
[9] FJ Thayer Fabrega, Jonathan C Herzog, and Joshua D Guttman. Strand spaces:
why is a security protocol correct? In Security and Privacy, 1998. Proceedings.
1998 IEEE Symposium on, pages 160–171. IEEE, 1998.
84
